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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION.¹

"Tota pulchra es, amica mea, et macula non est in te." (Cant. iv, 7).

In the first clause, eleventh chapter, of the General Constitutions of the Catholic University of America we read the following words: "The most blessed Virgin Mary Immaculate, who by her patronage fosters the Church of the United States, shall also be the celestial Patroness of the University, and her feast shall be celebrated solemnly each year, on the eighth of December." The action of the framers of those Constitutions, in choosing Mary Immaculate to be the principal Patroness of the University—St. Thomas of Aquin being the second Patron—was in keeping with all the traditions of the rising Church in our beloved country. From its earliest days this church, more particularly than any new portion of the Lord's vineyard, has been especially devoted and dedicated to the Blessed Virgin under the title of the Immaculate Conception. The Bishops assembled in the sixth Provincial Council of Baltimore, in the year 1846 (eight years before the Dogma was proclaimed), unanimously chose her to be the Patroness of the United States—"ardentibus votis, plausu, unanimique consensu" are the words used in the Acts of the Council. On February 7th, 1847, Pope Pius IX. approved the action of the Bishops, granting permission, when the feast fell on a week-

¹ Sermon delivered in Divinity Chapel, Catholic University of America, December 8, 1909.

day, to transfer the solemn celebration to the following Sunday, on which day all masses, private as well as solemn, and the Vesper Service, were to be of the Immaculate Conception. In the interval between the sixth and seventh Provincial Councils of Baltimore all Bishops throughout the world had been requested by Pius IX. to make known to him the sentiments of their subjects regarding Mary's Immaculate Conception. The Fathers of the seventh Provincial Council assured the Holy Father that in the United States both the clergy and the people had "great devotion" to the Immaculate Conception (n. 73). They went further and declared that it would be pleasing and acceptable to them if the Holy Father in his wisdom should judge it opportune to proclaim as a doctrine of the Church that the Blessed Virgin, in her conception, was immaculate and entirely free from the stain of original sin (*ibid.*, n. 74). Whatever causes, then, may be assigned to explain the fact, it is a fact that, from the first years of her life and vigorous activity, the Church in the United States was in a special manner devoted and dedicated to Mary Immaculate. Perhaps it was because Spain, France, Ireland and England, which sent Apostles to the new land, sent with the faith of Jesus Christ belief in a doctrine which may well be called a natural consequence of faith in the divinity of Christ, the Immaculate Conception of Mary, his Mother.

Spain is justly styled "the country of the Immaculate Conception." As early as the year 1398 John I., King of Arragon, solemnly placed his person and his kingdom under the protection of Mary Immaculate. In that land people were accustomed to place over the door or on the front of their houses a tablet with the words of Mary's privilege written on it: children were called by the name of "Concepcion": when the people met they greeted each other with an expression in honor of this mystery. *God's Mystic City*, a book written by a Spanish nun, Mary of Jesus, Abbess of the Convent of the Immaculate Conception of Agreda, inspired Murillo to paint his *Immaculate Conception*, the master-piece of the Spanish school. (Dom Gueranger, *Liturgical Year*, December 8th.)

France, in the days of Louis XIV. (1643-1715), obtained from Clement IX. that the feast of the Immaculate Conception should be kept with an octave throughout the Kingdom. For centuries previous to this the Theological Faculty of Paris had always exacted from its Professors an oath to defend this great privilege of Mary (*ibid.*). Ireland received from St. Patrick faith in Christ and devotion to his Mother; and ever since she received that faith she has been marked amongst all nations of the earth by great devotion to Mary and readiness to accept every doctrine and every practice that promoted the honor of the Mother of God.

It must be borne in mind, also, that the Catholics, who came to our shores in Lord Baltimore's Colony, came from the land of St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, a defender of Mary's Immaculate Conception. He was the author of an expression adopted by all theologians, including St. Thomas Aquinas: The purity of Mary is the greatest possible after that of God (*Lib. de Conceptu Virginali*, 18, *parum a princ.*).

From Spain, France, Ireland and England, which gave to America her first Apostles and the first members of the rising Church, we received, as a very precious inheritance, devotion to Mary's Immaculate Conception and confidence in her intercession. That the lesson learned from our forefathers was not forgotten is clearly shown by the Acts which I have cited, reflecting the sentiments of the Church of the United States, as they were voiced by the Bishops assembled in the Provincial Councils of Baltimore.

Some years passed after the celebration of the seventh Provincial Council of Baltimore (1849): the first Plenary Council of Baltimore was held in 1852: on the eighth day of December, 1854—just fifty-five years ago to-day—Pius IX. proclaimed the Dogma of the "Immaculate Conception." The Church in the United States was growing and prospering under the benign providence of God and the patronage of the Blessed Virgin; the Bishops of the country had no occasion for making a solemn and general announcement of their sentiments and of

the sentiments of their diocesans until the year of grace 1866, when they were assembled in the second Plenary Council of Baltimore, under the great Martin John Spalding, Archbishop of Baltimore and Delegate of the Apostolic See. What action did they take in the light of the definition of December 8th, 1854? They requested that the feast of the Immaculate Conception, Patroness of the United States, should be observed throughout the country as a *feast of precept*, i. e., with the obligation of hearing mass and of abstaining from servile work. The request was granted by Pius IX., October 6th, 1867, and the decree to that effect, signed by Cardinal Barnabo, Prefect of the Propaganda, was issued January 24th, 1868.

The Fathers of the third Plenary Council of Baltimore, held in 1884, desirous of procuring uniformity in the observance of holydays of obligation in the United States, requested the Holy See to suppress a few feasts of precept that were observed in some dioceses, but retained amongst the six to be kept as holydays of obligation, the feast of the Immaculate Conception. More than sufficient reasons for the devotion of the entire American Church to the Immaculate Mother are to be found in the almost miraculously rapid growth and extension of the Church in our country during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, especially during the forty years that elapsed between 1846—when Mary was solemnly chosen as Patroness of the United States—and 1884, the year of the third Plenary Council of Baltimore. In 1904, in his letter on the celebration of the Golden Jubilee of the Proclamation of the Immaculate Conception, Pope Pius X., now happily reigning, points to the miracles wrought at Lourdes as a solemn approbation from heaven of the definition of the Dogma. “No sooner had Pius IX. proclaimed as a Dogma of Catholic faith the exemption of Mary from original sin, than the Virgin herself began in Lourdes those wonderful manifestations, followed by vast and magnificent movements, which have produced those two temples dedicated to the Immaculate Mother, where the prodigies which still continue to take place through her intercession, furnish splendid arguments against the incredulity of our days.”

An appeal to miracles should not be made when facts can be attributed to natural causes. And we know that many natural causes, notably the tide of immigration contributed greatly to the growth of the Church in our land during the period of which I am speaking. Nevertheless, since we must not look always to the earth alone, but from time to time should raise our minds and our eyes to heaven, assuredly there are good grounds for the pious belief that, under the providence of God, we should give thanks to the Immaculate Mother for the extraordinary blessings obtained by her prayers and under her protection for the Church which chose her to be its Patroness. Here I ask you to join with me whilst I breathe a fervent prayer and express the hope that God may hasten the day when the growth and the success of this Catholic University of America may be pointed to as evident signs of the protection extended over it by our Patroness, Mary, the Immaculate Mother of Jesus.

But why should I speak of the future only? The history of the first two decades of the University's existence, including all the difficulties and trials and dangers that so often go with the beginnings of great undertakings, together with later struggles and misfortunes that tried the souls of great and courageous men: the triumph of the University as it stands to-day, having surmounted all difficulties, better prepared than ever before to do good work in this choice portion of the Lord's vineyard—all these things speak of the blessing of God on a work that was undertaken for His greater glory; they speak also of the protecting mantle of Mary Immaculate which has been extended over this important institution of learning. I do not neglect the powerful influence of natural causes that contributed to the successful foundation of the University and to the successful prosecution of the good work begun: they must be estimated according to their true value; it would be an act of base ingratitude to forget our first friends and benefactors. But, whilst we make due allowance for natural causes which contributed to success, we must not forget the occurrences which tended to produce difficulties and con-

fusion. In the opinion of serious men, friendly to the University, mistakes were made; it would have been a remarkable miracle had there been no false steps taken. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding these mistakes, the University lives and will continue to live and do good work in the cause of higher education. The explanation of this fact must be sought in a cause higher than the good will and the efforts of men; and I firmly believe that the higher causé is the blessing of God, obtained by the intercession of Mary Immaculate.

From these considerations it follows that everything pertaining to the glory of the Immaculate Mother should be specially dear to all professors, students and friends of the University. In loyalty to her, also, it is incumbent upon us to do all in our power, each one acting in his own sphere, in order that there may be no fault, or mistake, or apathy on the part of man to prevent this Institution from becoming one of the glories of Mary. Addressing myself particularly to the lay students and friends of the University I would urge them to keep these truths always in mind. Spread them far and wide. Your devotion and your enthusiasm will be communicated to others, and then we may have the happiness of witnessing a grand rally to support and to aid the Alma Mater, with the inspiring battle-cry: "For the honor and glory of God, and for the exaltation of our Patroness, the Immaculate Mother."

The battle-cry, I am sure, is one in which you will heartily join. When Pius IX., on December 8th, 1854, proclaimed the Dogma of the Immaculate Conception, a new jewel was added to the crown of glory that encircles the brow of our Blessed Mother in heaven. It would be more accurate to say that new brightness was added to one of the jewels in that crown, because the jewel had been placed there by the hand of God, and had been recognized by men many centuries before the Doctrine of the Immaculate Conception was solemnly proclaimed as an article of our faith. The Pope of Rome has no authority or power to make new revelations to the Church; but, by the power of the Holy Ghost, promised and sent by

the Saviour to teach the Church all truth (John xiv, 26 and xvi, 13), he has the authority to declare what is or is not contained in the deposit of revelation, which comes down to us from the days of Christ and of the Apostles.

In the Acts of the Vatican Council (Faith and Reason, C. IV) we read: "The doctrine of faith, which God has revealed, has not been proposed, like a philosophical intervention, to be perfected by human ingenuity, but has been delivered as a divine deposit to the Spouse of Christ, to be faithfully kept and infallibly declared Let the intelligence, science and wisdom of each and all, of individuals and the whole Church, in all ages and in all times, increase and flourish in abundance and vigor: but in its own proper kind, that is to say, in one and the same doctrine, one and the same sense, one and the same judgment." (Vincent of Lerins, *Commonitor*, C. 23-28. *The Vatican Council and its Definitions*, by Cardinal Manning, pp. 55 and 89.)

Pius IX., then made no new revelation, but "having with sighs petitioned the Paraclete Spirit," he solemnly declared that the doctrine of Mary's Immaculate Conception has been revealed by God, and "*consequently* is to be believed firmly and inviolably by all the faithful."

"We declare and pronounce and define that the doctrine which holds that the Blessed Virgin Mary, in the first instant of her conception, has been, by a special grace and privilege of Almighty God, and in view of the merits of Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the human race, preserved and exempted from every stain of original sin, is revealed by God, and consequently is to be believed firmly and inviolably by all the faithful." (Bull "*Ineffabilis Deus*," December 8th, 1854.) In the history of Catholic dogmas we can distinguish three stages: First, the stage of implicit faith; second, the stage of doubt and controversy; third, the stage of solemn declaration and of explicit faith. In the year 1854 the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception had passed through the first two stages. In the early ages of the Church it had been implicitly believed by the faithful, together with other doctrines, or parts of revelation, which had not been

fully developed in their minds, or, had not been explicitly proposed for their acceptance. Then came the stage of doubt and controversy, when learned and saintly men were ranged on opposite sides. The controversy was practically ended before the days of Pius IX., and the Catholic world was anxious for the third stage, the definition of the dogma, to be followed by the explicit faith of all the Catholics in the world.

By the definition all doubts were removed from the minds of any Catholics who might have been inclined to accept the teaching of some old theologians, who held that Mary was, indeed, sanctified *before her birth*, but *not in the first instant of her conception*. The Pope declared that the Blessed Virgin was exempted from the general law in virtue of which all children of Adam are "by nature children of wrath" (Ep. II, 3). Nay more, her exemption was a *special grace and privilege*, granted to Mary alone amongst all the children descending from Adam in the ordinary course of nature. In the case of Christ there could be no question of sin, since He was conceived, not by man, but by the power of the Holy Ghost. Mary being a descendant of Adam in the ordinary course of nature, her soul should and would have been stained by original sin, had not the grace and favor of God prevented and preserved her from contracting it: and this grace operated to make her sinless, not *after* she was conceived, but *in the very first instant of her conception*. This is the quintessence of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

Now that the dogma has been defined, the doctrine universally understood and accepted, some may ask: Why did learned and saintly men, during the period of doubt and controversy, hesitate and withhold their assent from a doctrine which agrees so admirably with all Catholic instincts relating to Jesus and His Mother? Two grave reasons are assigned to explain their hesitation: First, there was the doctrine of original sin, proposed in the sweeping declaration of St. Paul: "As by one man sin entered into the world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned" (Rom. v, 12). Prudent theologians make it a rule to refrain from asserting special

privileges of grace unless they are clearly made known by revelation. (See *e. g.*, S. Theol., 3 P. Qu. 1, A. 3, and Qu. xxvi, A. 6.) Before the definition many did not dare to assert that by a special privilege Mary was exempted from the general law. Then there was the doctrine of Christ, the Redeemer of all men. If Mary was never, not even for an instant, under sin, they argued, she did not need redemption, therefore Christ was not her Redeemer. Strange as it may seem to us, serious and saintly men failed to see that greater honor would accrue to Christ if, in virtue of His foreseen merits, Mary was exempted entirely from sin, rather than freed and redeemed from sin contracted; and they doubted until the development of Christian doctrine made it clear that their fears for Christ's glory were groundless.

Amongst those who either doubted or opposed this doctrine there were many who wore the white robes of the Order of St. Dominic. With many others they taught that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified *before her birth*, as were Jeremias the Prophet (Jer. 1, 5) and St. John the Baptist (Luke 1, 41): but in order to preserve the doctrine of original sin and of Christ's universal redemption, they held that she must have been, for at least one instant, under sin. I should abuse the esteemed privilege of speaking on this occasion were I to tire your patience by asking you to listen to an apology for the theologians of our Order who were opposed to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. Since, however, the true story of their position and of their influence pertains to the true history of the dogma on which our minds are centered, I believe that you are willing to hear a brief statement on this subject. It is not true that the Order of St. Dominic, as a body, combated the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. Those who desire to know the facts relating to this question can find them in books treating the subject, *e. g.*, in Bishop Ullathorne's *Immaculate Conception* (p. 144), and in the *Tractatus de Bma. Virgine Maria*, of Father Lepicier, Professor of Theology in the Propaganda (P. II, Cap. 1, Art. 1, n. 19, VI, pp. 119-120). There is a very ancient tradition that the book which St. Dominic

cast into the fire as a test of his teaching against the Albigensians, and which was miraculously preserved from the flames, contained a defence of the Immaculate Conception.

Father Pacifici, a Franciscan, declares that twenty-one thousand Dominicans, in taking their degrees at the University of Paris, solemnly pledged themselves to defend this privilege of Mary. At the Council of Trent twenty-five Dominican Bishops signed a petition for the definition of the dogma. Father Rouard de Card, who succeeded Father Lacordaire as Provincial of the Dominicans of Belgium, enumerated ten thousand professors of the Order who taught that Mary was conceived without sin. St. Vincent Ferrer defended the true doctrine as did Father Dominic Soto, one of the most distinguished theologians of the Council of Trent, and in this they have been followed by all Spanish members of the Order. As early as the year 1356 there existed Confraternities of the Immaculate Conception, attached to the Dominican Churches in Naples, Seville, Brussels and elsewhere. Some theologians who held high positions in the Order were opposed to the doctrine, and thus it came about that the opinions of a few were spread abroad as the sentiments of the entire religious body. The attitude of those theologians was due, in a great measure, to certain passages of doubtful meaning in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, one of the greatest theologians, if not the greatest theologian, of the Catholic Church, whom Leo XIII. replaced on the pinnacle of glory which he had occupied for so many centuries. Any discussion about the opinion of St. Thomas on this subject belongs to the class-room rather than to the pulpit. If there are any persons here present who wish to make a study of this question. I should be glad to assist them at any time convenient for them and for me.

The *obvious* meaning of some texts in the *Summa Theologica* is contrary to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. Cardinal Lambruschini, who was living in 1854, and many others held that there had been some tampering with the text of St. Thomas' works by unscrupulous copyists and editors; and they brought forward ancient editions of his works, wherein

it is clearly stated that the Blessed Virgin was at all times free from sin, even original sin. Others say that St. Thomas wavered and hesitated. In his latest works, as we have them to-day, he does not explicitly affirm the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, but he lays down the principles from which Catholic theologians deduced this doctrine, and it cannot be shown that he professedly and explicitly rejects it. With St. Anselm he declares that the purity of Mary was the greatest possible after that of Christ (3P. Qu. 27, Art. 2, ad 2um).

He says that "*since we do not know precisely at what time the Blessed Virgin was sanctified*—all admitting it was before her birth—we celebrate the feast of her sanctification on the day of her conception" (*Ibid.*, ad 3um). It must be borne in mind that he wrote at a time when the theories of conception and animation were far different from those accepted by the best biologists of our times. It is worthy of note that amongst those who defend the Angelic Doctor, in treating this question, there are serious writers who are not of the Order of St. Dominic, notably Father Cornoldi, S. J., who wrote a book on the subject. Shall we give the great Doctor the benefit of the doubt, and accept the most favorable interpretation of his words? His great name and the signal services his writings have rendered to the Church entitle him to expect a friendly disposition. He is not the first saint and doctor who wrote in language that seems obscure or inaccurate to those who live in the noon-day of revelation fully developed and understood; and if he erred on this point, this is the only important doctrinal error found in his works. Granting that he erred, he would still be the great St. Thomas, and his mistake would serve to show all the more clearly that the Church of God is not dependent on the services of any one theologian, be he a St. Cyprian, a St. Augustine or a St. Thomas.

"Roma locuta est: causa finita est." Rome spoke fifty-five years ago; the disputed question was then settled once and for ever. Whatever the past may have been, I can assure you that there are not to be found in the world to-day more ardent admirers of Mary's Immaculate Conception than the brethren

of St. Thomas. The Dominicans of the United States rejoiced and gave thanks to God when in 1904—the Jubilee Year of the dogma—Providence made it possible for them to dedicate to Mary, the College of the Immaculate Conception, the great white building which stands near the Catholic University. They will be found always in the foremost ranks of Mary's devout clients: they will always join most earnestly in the prayer with which I close: May God continue to bless the Church in the United States; may God continue to bless the Catholic University of America, for the honor and glory of the sacred name of Jesus, for the exaltation of His Mother, who is also our Mother, and our Patroness, Mary the Immaculate Virgin!

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THE NEW PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE—A CRITICISM.¹

(Continued.)

II.

BEING AND BECOMING.

Essentially pragmatic in its theories of common sense and of scientific knowledge, the New Philosophy is essentially intuitive in Metaphysics or Philosophy.

Intuition and the intuitive process constitute the original and specific element of the theory of metaphysical knowledge in the New Philosophy, as the notion of continuous Becoming constitutes the fundamental and primary element in its theory of reality. As these two elements, which moreover, correspond to each other, are the soul of the New Philosophy, the original character from which it derives its name and through which it exercises its influence,—Professor William James tells us that “Bergson’s philosophy is what has led him personally to renounce the intellectualistic method and the current notion that Logic is an adequate measure of what can and cannot be—”² it is a matter of importance and interest for us to subject them to a careful examination and to determine their true or illusory value.³ And by opposing to the New Philosophy the principles of the traditional Philosophy, viz., that of Being and Concept as found in its full vigor in the genuine Scholastic Philosophy, we shall show that it is the latter, as old as humanity and yet ever young in its immutable and fruitful elements, that gives the true explanation of Reality.

¹ Cf. *The Catholic University Bulletin*, April, 1906 ; March, 1908 ; June, 1909 ; November, 1909.

² “A pluralistic universe,” 1909. Lecture VI.

³ See our first article in the *Bulletin*, March, 1906, with the bibliography ; to the works mentioned we must add the more recent one by Bergson : “*L’Evolution créatrice*.” (Paris, 1907).

METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PHILOSOPHY.

Let us first summarize the metaphysical principles of the New Philosophy and its criticism of the traditional Philosophy, as they are presented in the works of Professor Bergson and in Professor LeRoy's articles, without intending, however, to vouch that the disciple has always held fast to the master's thought or has not carried it to consequences which the master would disown.⁴

There is an external reality, but this reality is immediately present to the mind. On this point, common sense is right in its opposition to the Idealism and Realism of philosophers. But while philosophy led by mechanistic prejudices, even to our day has represented the world as an organization of things and events distinct from each other and of relations fixed and permanent, because it was easier to conceive its elements as material units distributed through space and subject to static laws, the New Philosophy starts with the fundamental principle that reality is mobile. Rest is but apparent or rather relative; reality is continuous tendency and tendency is an actual change of direction in its incipient stage. So, true reality is made up not of things but of actions; it is made up of actions created and constantly creating themselves through the vital energy or "*élan vital*" immanent in them, which continues and realizes more and more the primal creative action. These *actions* in their making are the Mind. *Things* are merely the forms presented to our senses by the actions in the process of their unmaking and dissolving: they constitute what we call Matter.

The actions therefore which constitute reality are not distinct from and merely dependent upon each other, they are indistinct and fused into each other. Number, space and time are notions useful to practical life and scientific knowledge,

⁴We do not examine here Prof. LeRoy's applications of his philosophical principles to Theology. They have been and they remain condemned. Our present study however will help to make clear the justice of this condemnation.

applicable to matter, but they are not primary data of reality. And so it is with the internal acts of consciousness; they do not follow and succeed each other, they endure and are continuous.

Hence, if there is in nature neither fixity of things nor multiplicity and distinction of events, but a continuous and ever-flowing Becoming, we cannot speak of cause and effect, of antecedent and consequent, of the reproduction of the same antecedents and the same consequents. The law of causality, useful to common sense and scientific systematization, is not an element of pure reality, nor does it therefore express a philosophical principle. In the same way, philosophy knows nothing of order or hierarchical classification into genera and species, since nature does not contain any diversity and multiplicity of elements. Nor does it know of the principle of finality as a law of reality, since finality implies distinction between means and end and subordination of means to end, while nature is essentially indistinct flux and continuity. Finally, the principle of identity or contradiction itself may be a law of common and scientific thought, but it is not a law of reality, nor therefore of philosophical thought, for it implies a certain stability and permanence; and for the New Philosophy there is no permanence in nature; nature is essentially a continuous Becoming.

Thus all these notions and principles, according to the New Philosophy, are common sense and scientific notions and principles. They are legitimate, viz., useful in their field; but they are not legitimate in Metaphysics and Philosophy. Science indeed, as well as common sense, is above all practical. Accordingly it does not care about pure reality, viz., the acts in the making, but rather about matter and things, viz., reality in the unmaking, which can be used and controlled. It proceeds through intelligence,⁵ discursive reason and logic, geometrical perceptions and static conceptions. But intelligence with its concepts and its logic does not reach reality which is essentially

⁵ We must always keep in mind that, for the New Philosophy, "*intelligence*" means discursive reason, that is, knowledge looking for practical representations and results, and so it is essentially distinct from and opposite to "*intuition*," or knowledge of the pure reality.

ever moving; for, if we may extract static concepts from the moving reality, it remains always impossible to rebuild the mobility of reality by means of the stability of such concepts. All the attempts to prove the relativity of knowledge are tainted with an original defect; they suppose as well as the Dogmatism which they attack, that all knowledge must necessarily start from clearly outlined concepts in order to grasp the flowing reality.

The fundamental error of philosophy therefore, in its general development from the Greeks up to our own day, according to the New Philosophy, has been to take for its object things rather than actions, and for its process logic rather than intuition. By so doing, it has become a mere extension of science; it partakes of its native and essential weakness, because it is based on the same fundamental prejudices, viz., "*reification*" and parcelling out (*morcelage*). It takes divers and instantaneous views of reality, combines them as the cinematograph combines divers photographic images, and gives the appearance of moving reality. It lays the foundation of Logic; but it is a system of conceptual Logic based on artificial identities and similitudes which deform reality without perceiving it. It has drawn out the general outline of a certain metaphysics, but of "the metaphysics natural to human intelligence,"⁶ viz., the metaphysics of this faculty which aims, above all, at practical representations and results, and sacrifices reality to usefulness.

In a word, philosophy has been intellectualistic, and intellectualism, although it is necessary to express and communicate to others the knowledge acquired, is naturally unable to apprehend reality. It proceeds through concepts, and concept necessarily implies a deformation of reality.

In what then does philosophy consist, and what is its proper function and process? To philosophize, the new school answers, is to invert the habitual direction of the process of thought. Being does not exist, all is Becoming; there are no distinct things or states in nature, all is continuous; reality is never

⁶ Bergson, "*L'Évolution créatrice*," p. 352.

made but always in the making; the substance of reality is duration. "There is more in motion than in the successive positions attributed to the mobile; there is more in the Becoming than in the forms successively gone through; and there is more in the evolution of the form than the diverse forms successively realized."⁷ Reality is the "*élan vital*," the spirit and the mind made of life and consciousness which, continuing the primal creative action, realizes and creates itself through progressive stages and differentiations of nature into plant, animal and man, or by reason of obstacles and impotency, unmakes itself gradually into matter. Philosophy then is the coming into an immediate contact with pure reality itself, viz., with the concrete Becoming in the very act of its making. This cannot be obtained either by the representation of the Becoming taken as an object of knowledge or by a synthesis of concepts, since concepts, being essentially fixed and static, represent only pauses, successive positions of the Becoming, not Becoming itself. The only possible means to realize such an immediate contact is to live the Becoming, and the necessary process is intuition or intellectual sympathy which makes us penetrate into and live the life of the actions and events which constitute the universe. To dive back into the stream of the moving reality,—we are using an image and the language in accordance with the symbolistic character of the New Philosophy,—to let ourselves flow in and with it through all its currents and windings: such is the task of the philosopher, and such is the special and strenuous effort which constitutes the proper philosophical attitude.

What then becomes of truth in such a system of philosophy? Here we follow more especially in the steps of Prof. Le Roy.⁸ Traditional Philosophy defines truth as a conformity between an object and the mind: "*adequatio rei et intellectus*." According to the New Philosophy, such a definition cannot be

⁷ Bergson, "*L'Évolution créatrice*," p. 341.

⁸ On this special point the reader may consult with profit the excellent treatment of this question by J. de Tonquédec: "*La notion de vérité dans la philosophie nouvelle*," Paris, 1908.

reality, that is, Becoming in its making, once created, goes on accepted, for it implies that reality is outside our thought without any means left to reach it; moreover, it exacts an agreement between reality and thought which can never be verified; finally, it implies a comparison which supposes that we can apprehend the object otherwise than by thought. Truth, the New Philosophy says, does not imply any external term on which it depends; it is not the result of contemplative knowledge; it is action itself in the making, and it must be defined in terms of life. We must not call truth immutable and eternal, for it has nothing fixed or static; it is living: "that which ceases to progress diminishes, that which ceases to adapt and transform itself gets old and dies."⁹ In Philosophy no question is ever solved; philosophy is by nature perpetual invention and reinvention. A truth is never established, it passes through a system but never stops in it; if it does, it becomes an error. Philosophical systems are not false, they have their value, but this value is momentary; they represent truth at a certain moment of its making, at a certain stage of its progressive life, but they become false as soon as they are considered definitive. Their true value consists in preparing that which shall, some day, outgrow them; it is a value of transition.¹⁰ So there is no truth completely made and fixed in any form or thought; it is continuously in the making; what is stable in it is above all an orientation and a sense of development.¹¹

How then shall we distinguish truth from error, and what is the criterion of truth? The criterion of truth is life. All that is capable of duration, all that resists critical dissolution and is the source of fruitfulness is true as long as, and in the measure in which, it realizes itself, is useful and is a principle of life.¹²

We may understand now, in what sense truth is said by the New Philosophy to be free. Truth and reality are one, and

⁹ E. Le Roy, "Dogme et critique," p. 349.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ E. Le Roy, "Sur la notion de vérité," in "Correspondance de l'Union pour la Vérite," n. 1. 1906.

¹² "Dogme et critique," pp. 157, 158.

creating and realizing itself, not according to a plan fixed beforehand, but by an internal and unconditioned effort, through a process of continuous selection between the divers possible directions. Its development is not regulated by necessity, nor by any fixed law, not even the law of contradiction; it is not, however, left to its arbitrary caprice; it is free. There are indeed true and false developments; both are possible, the former are obligatory, though not necessitating. The divers laws which govern matter, the divers principles which regulate the mental life, such as axioms, categories, desires, etc., are not primitive; they have been constituted in virtue of decrees laid down by ourselves; they are subject to evolution and we can change them.

Common sense therefore is made of the usual notions, which constitute the rudimentary representations of the universe as necessary for life; its end is not to represent reality as it is, but to picture it in a way the simplest and most practical for the needs of daily life. Science is made up of static concepts and principles supposedly immutable; its end is not to represent reality in itself, but to give us the simplest, handiest and most efficacious means to use the forces of nature. Philosophy alone has for its direct object reality itself; it reaches it through intuition which makes us enter into reality and live it; for reality is essentially life and ever progressing Becoming.

It is easily seen, after this rather long summary, how this philosophy is new and how fundamentally it is opposed, as a philosophy of continuity, Becoming and intuition, to the traditional philosophy which is one of multiplicity, being and concept. It now remains to examine the position and claims of the "New Philosophy" on these points; this examination will show that the traditional philosophy is still the true philosophy.¹³

¹³ For a more extensive study and critical examination of the principles of the New Philosophy we refer the reader to the excellent works of A. Farges: "*Théorie fondamentale de l'acte et de la puissance*," 7me édit. (Paris, 1909) and of Garri-gou-Lagrange O. P.: "*Le sens commun, la philosophie de l'être et les formules dogmatiques*," Paris, 1909; also to a good article by B. Jacob: "*La philosophie d'hier et celle d'aujourd'hui*," in *Rev. de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Mars, 1898.

MULTIPLICITY AND CONTINUITY; BEING AND BECOMING.

The "New Philosophy" maintains therefore that all is continuity in nature and continuity is essentially duration, change, becoming; that the immediate data of perception represent nature as an immense mass shapeless, continuous, ever moving and changing. It claims that the notion of nature, as accepted by common sense, science and traditional philosophy which consider the real universe as an organization of divers and stable elements, is an artificial conception, built under the influence of practical utility and desire for clear reasoning, and based upon two postulates, viz., the postulate of the parcelling out (*postulat du morcelage*) and the postulate of the static reification (*postulat de la réification statique*). Let us now examine these fundamental principles of the New Philosophy.

Is it indistinct continuity rather than manifold discontinuity and diversity which constitutes pure reality? We answer that reality is fundamentally made up of manifold and distinct, stable and constant elements; that in nature itself our senses and our mind find the diversity of objects contained in their representations and conceptions. It is true that our primitive sensual perception of nature, that of the new-born child, represents nature as a vague, indistinct and moving continuity. St. Thomas himself, after Aristotle, declares it: our primitive perception, he says, is that of a vague continuity (*continuum indivisible, totum universale*), where all elements are more or less blended into an indistinct whole. But, as he remarks, senses and mind begin with common and obscure knowledge, and this primitive perception of our senses and of our mind is only a confused perception.¹⁴ Why should we make this degree of knowledge the type of all knowledge, and the child's knowledge the type of perfect human knowledge? Moreover, this perception, though vague and indistinct, does not represent

¹⁴Summ. Theol. I. P. Q. LXXXV, a. 3, 8. Those who wish to acquire a clear notion of the scholastic theory of intellectual knowledge should carefully study the whole question as well as those which immediately precede and follow it.

all its elements as entirely confused. It has some outlines, more or less discernible, of their multiplicity, together with their diversity of relations in space and time. Even for the new-born child, color is not sound and sound is not resistance. As soon as attention is fixed on reality and more experience is acquired, this distinction between objects becomes more and more defined and their relations are more and more clearly determined. A few moments after his birth, the child will follow with his eyes the motion of a light through space. On what ground can we consider the primitive and spontaneous perception as natural, and the attentive and reflective perceptions as illusory? We are told that these distinctions between divers objects and their relations are due to the influence of practical utility; that for the sake of clearer representation, we create both space with its divers parts, and time with its successive instants, in which we cut up the continuous and moving reality into distinct, separated and static objects. We shall not deny indeed, that our practical needs have a certain influence on our knowledge; but what is precisely the part played by them in this work? We may clearly see that it does not consist in creating artificial distinctions between elements indistinct by nature. Our practical needs and interests help and direct us in recognizing real and already existing diversity, though not yet perceived, by their power to attract and to fix our attention. Far from creating space and time in order to separate what is continuous and to stop what is moving, it is through the real distinctions which we perceive in the objects and phenomena that we know space and time.¹⁵ The child acquires a clearer and more individual perception first of the beings and things by which he is surrounded, viz., of those beings and things which he needs most and which interest him most. Neither these needs, however, nor these interests create for him the individuality of those beings and objects; it exists in reality itself; but needs and interests, by putting him into more intimate contact with those objects, make him realize

¹⁵ S. Thomas, *Contra Gent.*, I. III, c. 39.

better and more clearly their particular and distinctive characters. All our senses concur in this work of progressive knowledge, more particularly vision and touch. Touch has a special prominence in the work of discrimination, by reason of its object, resistance. But touch does not, more than the other senses, create its special object; it merely perceives its particular and individual characters. All the senses, by a spontaneous discrimination of their proper objects (*sensus communis* of Aristotle and of the Schoolmen), realize more and more the distinction between the material objects and perceive more clearly, in the primal and confused continuity, the elementary parts truly distinct but closely united which constitute reality. Does not Professor Bergson himself tell us that life "manifests a desire for individuality, that it tends to constitute naturally isolated, naturally closed systems"? Does he not speak of "organisms completely individualized"? These are his words: "The universe is a collection of solar systems and everything compels us to consider them as analogous to our own. These systems indeed are not absolutely independent of one another. Our sun irradiates heat and light to the most remote planet and, on the other side, our solar system moves in a well-defined direction as if it were attracted. There is therefore a bond between the worlds. But this bond may be considered as infinitely loose in comparison with the solidarity which unites the parts of one and the same world between themselves. In such a way that it is not by mere artifice or by mere reasons of expediency, that we isolate our solar system; nature itself invites us to isolate it."¹⁶ Does he not maintain that the "*élan vital*" has diversified itself into manifold streams distinct not only in degree but in nature? We are far from absolute continuity.

The same must be said of the elements and events of conscious life. When I experience a feeling of hope and then, on account of adverse circumstances, a feeling of despair, it is very true that this latter feeling takes on a peculiar qualitative

¹⁶ Bergson, *L'Évolution créatrice*, pp. 11, 13, 14, 17, 262.

aspect under the influence of the former. Must I conclude that the feeling of despair is not distinct from the feeling of hope, but merely continues and prolongs it by a kind of condensing process? But my consciousness tells me very plainly that the second feeling is distinct from the first, that it succeeds it, reacts against it; that far from continuing it, it replaces and opposes it. They are indeed related to each other but this relation is not a relation of unity and continuity; it is a relation of diversity and solidarity and even in the present case, a solidarity of opposition and contrast.

In a word, the New Philosophy proves very well that there is between the objects of nature and its phenomena a close and complex solidarity; this solidarity it describes very minutely; but it does not and cannot prove that nature is mere continuity and becoming. Spontaneous as well as reflective experience plainly disprove such a theory.

Our criticism, so far, has been more especially based on the observation of the data of our sensual perceptions. From the point of view of intellectual knowledge we shall see, even more clearly, that the true elements which constitute reality are permanent beings and not the flowing becoming, multiplicity of beings and not continuity of the Becoming, distinction between beings and not mere difference of moments and stages in the evolution of the Becoming. In our very first act of knowledge, not only do our senses act and vaguely perceive the surrounding phenomena, but our intelligence is also exercised. The first knowledge of the child, whatever its degree of clearness or confusion may be, is truly human knowledge. As the eye sees colours, and the ear hears sounds, so also our intellect, by a natural act of abstraction from the concrete and individual phenomena, perceives Being which is its proper object, as color is the proper object of vision, and sound that of hearing. As St. Thomas remarks, this first intellectual perception is very vague and confused.¹⁷ It is however real knowledge, and this apprehension of Being is the very element by which

¹⁷ *Summ. Theol.* 1a. Quest. II., a. 2; Q. LXXXIV, a. 7; Q. LXXXV, a. 3, 8.

human knowledge differs from mere animal knowledge. Man does not see, hear or touch anything without perceiving, at the same time, through and under the phenomena of color, sound and resistance, Being which will constitute the element of his ideas, the basis of all his judgments and reasonings.¹⁸ This apprehension is not the conclusion of a complex reasoning but an immediate and spontaneous operation, a natural abstractive intuition of Being. As color is an immediate object of intuition to my eye, my pleasure or pain an object of intuition to my consciousness, so also Being is an object of intuition to my intelligence. I apprehend it in external reality because it is there and I am intelligent, as I perceive color and pleasure because I have eyes and consciousness. Here we may quote with approval the following passage from Professor James: "The very first sensation which an infant gets is for him the outer universe. And the universe which he comes to know in later life is nothing but an amplification of that first simple germ which, by accretion on the one hand and intussusception on the other has grown so big and complex and articulate that its first state is unrememberable. In his dumb awakening to the consciousness of *something there*, a mere *this* as yet (or something for which even the term *this* would perhaps be too discriminative, and the intellectual acknowledgment of which would be better expressed by the bare interjection "lo!"), the infant encounters an object in which (though it be given in a pure sensation) all the "categories of the understanding" are contained. It has externality, objectivity, unity, substantiality, causality, in the full sense in which any later object or system of objects has these things. Here the young knower meets and greets his world; and the miracle of knowledge bursts forth, as Voltaire says, as much in the infant's lower sensation as in the highest achievement of Newton's brain."¹⁹

In this apprehension of the notion of Being, by the light of

¹⁸ St. Thomas: *Contr. Gentes.* 1. II, c. 83; *de Veritate*, Q. I; *Sum. Theol.* Q. XII, a. 4; Q. LXXXIV, a. 7; Q. LXXXV, a. 3; Ia IIae Q. xciv, a. 2; *Opusc.* 44, *Summa totius Logicae*, Tract. 3, c. 1.

¹⁹ *Psychology*, ch. II, p. 15-16.

natural reflection, our intelligence perceives immediately the principle of identity: Whatever is, is; or in its negative form, the principle of contradiction: Whatever is, cannot at the same time not be. Our notion of Being, so vague and confused in its first apprehension, becomes more and more distinct. By reflecting upon its own act of apprehension, man perceives itself as relative to Being, as a knowing Being relative to and distinct from a known thing, and so grasps the distinction of Being into object and subject, into non-ego and ego.²⁰ Pursuing its work of reflection upon sensual data, our intelligence perceives the notion and principle of substance. The multiplicity, the unceasing and successive changes which exist in nature, as manifested by and realized in the sensual phenomena, are not intelligible except in relation to Being as one and permanent, identical with itself, subject of the phenomena and uniting bond of their multiplicity and succession. Without the existence of permanent Being, we are left in presence of an absolute discontinuity and dispersion where continuity and Becoming themselves disappear. The New Philosophy has not sufficiently noticed that an absolute Becoming implies an absolute discontinuity. If it has, it may have declined to consider this situation, under the pretext that we are here in a field superior, not subject, to contradiction. But reality and the fundamental exigencies of reason, which reflect reality, are stronger than systems and theories. In the writings of these philosophers we read of "an underlying fundamental noumenon"; the universe is described as "an immense continuity of unceasing transformations" or as "a whole" (*un Tout*) where each thing finds the root of its realization; the bodies of the universe are said to be "foci of co-ordination" or "centres of perspective." They may and probably will answer that such terms are mere symbols necessary to express our intuition of reality.

Be that as it may, the New Philosophy, dominated by the influence of the Becoming, following on the steps of Heraclitus

²⁰ St. Thomas, *de Veritate*, Q. 1, a. 1-9.

and Hegel, denies the principles of contradiction in order to maintain the supposed existence of the absolute Becoming, as Parmenides denied the Becoming in order to maintain the existence of the Being. But, as Aristotle remarks, both Being and Becoming are imposed upon us by reality itself and the reality of Becoming can be maintained and understood only in relation to Being.²¹ Becoming is that which can be and is not. It is not a mere nonentity, yet it is not a complete being; it is a mixture of entity and nonentity. This is not, as Hegel would say, a "contradiction realized," for this composite motion is not being and non-being under the same aspect; it is being in relation to mere nonentity, and it is non-being in relation to a perfectly realized being. Becoming therefore is intelligible only as far as we distinguish between completely realized or actual being (called by Aristotle and the Schoolmen *ἐντελέχεια*, "actus"), and indetermined and potential being, intermediate between mere nothingness and complete realization (*δύναμις*, *potentia*). With the help of these notions Becoming is intelligible. It is the passage from potency to act: the ball in its rolling is in potency to its term, the germ to the plant, the embryo to the adult state. Essentially incomplete and unintelligible in itself, Becoming can be understood only in relation to a starting point and to a term, in relation to Being as the uniting bond between its divers elements.²²

Becoming, moreover, in the process of its realization implies another element, viz., an external principle which may determine and direct its activity. Existing only in the state of potency it needs an efficient cause to actualize its tendency and it implies at the same time an end which may determine its direction, and the attainment of which will constitute its actual perfection, viz., a final cause; hence the notion and principle of causality.²³

²¹ *I. Metaphysic.* 1, 5; *Comm. of St. Thomas*, L. 9; *I. Physic.* C. 8; *Comm. of St. Thomas*, L. 14.

²² *Arist.*: *I Physic.* c. 8.; *Comm. of St. Thomas*, L. XIV.; *St. Thomas*, C. *Gentes*, L. 3. c2; *Summ. Theol.* Ia. Q. VII. a. 1; Q. XLIV, a. 4.; Q. LXXXV. a. 5; Ia. IIae, Q. I. a. 2. etc.

²³ *St. Thomas*, *In IV, Metaphys.* L. v, VI.; *de Veritate*, Q. x., a. 6-8.; Ia. Q. CXVII, a. 1; Ia. IIae. Q. LI., a. 1. etc.

Looking at the universe in the light of these notions of Being, substance, act and potency, causality, we may then perceive and penetrate into the constitution and order of the universe, where multiplicity, diversity and progressive gradation are combined with unity, identity and permanence in the essential distinctions which form the classes of beings and the dynamic relations which unite them.

All the considerations hitherto developed are nothing more than the very data of common sense.²⁴ They are also those of metaphysical intuition and reflection because they are the very data presented by reality itself to human reason.²⁵

Beings and things, substances and phenomena or accidents, act and potency, causes and effects, order and classes, the New Philosophy tells us, are the result of a pragmatic parcelling out, of an artificial distinction which we create because we need it in our language and in our practical dealings with nature. All these notions, we answer, are the very elements of a natural parcelling out, necessary distinctions which reality imposes upon us, because reality is truly constituted by them and so is intelligible only through them. Such distinctions are indeed due to our reflection and to our striving after clearness, but neither our striving after clearness nor our reflection create them. We discover them in nature itself as its constituent elements; and the more we penetrate into nature, the more also do these distinctions display to the eyes of our reason their real diversity and relations.

We are asked why "we would not reduce Being to Becoming."²⁶ We answer that it is impossible, for Becoming then would itself be unintelligible. Becoming indeed is a potency which demands an actual Being at its starting point and at its term. Otherwise it cannot exist, because it cannot become. As Becoming, it is not yet and, when it is, it has ceased to become.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ On the Scholastic theory of common sense and its relations with philosophy, see the above-mentioned work by Father Garrigou-Lagrange.

²⁶ E. Le Roy : Comment se pose le problème de Dieu. (*Rev. de Mét. et de Mor.*, Mars, 1907.)

We can now point out the initial and fundamental error contained in the following sentence, already quoted, from Professor Bergson, which expresses, we believe, the essence of his whole system: "There is more in a motion than in the successive positions attributed to the mobile, more in the becoming than in the forms passed successively through, and there is more in the evolution of the form than the diverse forms successively realized." Let us apply such a principle to concrete cases, and we shall have to say that there is more in the potency than in the act, more in the motion toward an end than in the actual possession of the end, more in the germ in its process of growth than in the adult. Such assertions bear within themselves their own refutations. In reality, Professor Bergson and his disciples are here laboring under the very illusion which they have so much deprecated in others: they are misled by mechanistic symbols. Professor Bergson represents immobility and immutability under the symbol of inertia, of crystallized and dead beings. But perfect immobility and immutability truly consists in the act fully realized, in the perfection reached and permanently possessed. In the living being, it is the fulness of vital energy actually reached; from the point of view of life, the animal is more perfect when sated than in the process of eating. As finite life is always imperfect, there is always in its process a recurrence of act and potency. But in the perfect and infinite Being, in the pure Act, thought and love are in their full perfection, free from any potency, and the very essence of this Being consists in the immutable possession of its perfection, in an immutable and eternal act of perfect thought and perfect love. This immutability and immobility has its principle not in death, but in fulness of life and action.²⁷

We are accused of "reifying" everything and of denying motion and duration; of conceiving motion and time in function of space, as a succession of static moments placed side by side in order to be enabled to measure and use them. Such an accusation is unwarranted. We maintain that motion as well

²⁷ St. Thomas, Ia. Q. IX. a. 2; Q. XVIII, a. 1, 3; IIa IIae. Q. LXXXI, a. 8.

as time does not consist simply in static and successive positions, but in the real passage from one point or moment to another: "*Fluxus ipsius nunc.*"²⁸ What Professor Bergson rightly criticizes is the notion of motion as defined by Descartes "the transfer of a part of matter or of a body from things immediately adjoining and considered as being at rest, to other things,"²⁹ a definition which in fact ignores mobility, foregoes qualitative and quantitative motion to consider simply local motion. The scientist who wishes to measure the Becoming must view it in its static element, in its relations to space and time which supply him with fixed landmarks; he neglects the passage in its flowing to consider it in the positions which mark its direction and velocity. This view is indeed incomplete, but it is not false; for these static elements are a constituent part of motion and time as well as the very element of mobility.

It has been said of the New Philosophy that it is a renewal of sensualism and materialism.³⁰ We do not see how it can evade this accusation. By affirming that the mind is the essence of reality, and matter a mere dissolution of the mind, the New Philosophy has attempted to overcome the existence of matter and its influence. But it happens that in reality, matter exists, not as a degradation of the mind, but as a natural element of nature, as primitive and essential in the constitution of our universe as mind itself, and imposes its natural control upon duration and motion.

Matter is indeed a principle of imperfection—and it would be interesting to compare the theories of Professor Bergson on individuality and distinction with the Thomistic theory of the principle of individuation—; but it is a natural principle of imperfection which enters into the constitution of all the beings, man included, which constitute our universe. There is no pure mind in our world. Hence all that the New Philosophy calls pure and immediate data, such as pure duration

²⁸ Sum. Theol. Ia P. Q. x. a. 4, ad 2.

²⁹ Lettre 24. Principe de la philosophie, 2 P. n. 23.

³⁰ Couturat, "Contre le nominalisme de M. Le Roy." (*Rev. de Mét. et de Mor.*, Janvier, 1900.) ; Jacob, *Art. Côt.*

and pure mobility, is in reality an illusion. Becoming and duration, life and consciousness are naturally dependent on matter; under the influence of matter, duration is time, life exists only in connection with material bodies and mind itself exists only as the form of matter; and all existing beings are subject to space. Such are the primitive data of perception and apprehension. To deny matter is not to suppress it. Matter takes its revenge by making its necessary influence and control felt everywhere.

The New Philosophy calls itself an Idealism in the sense that it reduces reality to image; but this very reduction is a negation of intellectual idea. Instead of looking for the intelligible reality under the sensual data which dissimulate it, it looks for the sensual phenomena which are supposed to be masked by the Intelligible.³¹ So under the pretext of grasping reality more closely, it refuses to understand it. Instead of dominating the sensual phenomena through the knowledge of the intelligible elements, it drowns itself in the sensual and the unconscious.³² Such is the revenge of matter.

We may now better appreciate the errors of the theory of intuition and truth as advocated by the New Philosophy and realize the validity of the theory of abstraction and concepts, which constitutes the theory of knowledge in the traditional Philosophy.

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(To be Concluded.)

³¹ Jacob: art. cit.

³² Couturat: art. cit., p. 18.

THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND.¹

II.

This article should deal with the four Charters and the four Statutes, and an attempt will be made to do so; but the exigencies of space will not allow me to analyze them all so fully as I should wish and as they intrinsically deserve. I shall therefore devote my attention principally to an exposition of the Charter and the Statute of the University, as being of prime importance, passing lightly over the Charters and the Statutes of the three Constituent Colleges, but at the same time pointing out whatever of particular interest they seem to me to contain. This plan is all the more feasible as, in general, the government of each College is modelled on the government of the University.

Before proceeding to a detailed examination of any of those documents, I should premise that the Statutes are, so to say, a translation of the Charters into action. It is only fair also to state that, in drawing up the Statutes, the Commissioners appear to have gone about their task in a workmanlike way. In the first place, they invited representations from the Senate of the University, from the governing body of each of the Colleges, and from bodies or persons claiming to be interested parties. Secondly, they visited several important British cities, where there are modern universities, in order to investigate the provisions made therein for technological and commercial education, and took the evidence of experts in those branches of study. In their report they acknowledge the valuable information which they received, on matters connected with technological, agricultural, and commercial teaching of a university standard, from various university authorities and other educationists. They next conferred with the resident commissioner

¹See *Catholic University Bulletin*, February, 1910, for the first article on this subject.

of National Education in Ireland with reference to the extension of the advantages of academic teaching to the more distinguished of the King's Scholars in residence in the Training Colleges of the Board of National Education, and with the secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction as to the establishment of co-ordination between the technological work of the Dublin Royal College of Science and the teaching of applied science in the University. They also had interviews with representatives of the Gaelic League and of the School of Irish Learning, and with various authorities on music, architecture, commerce, and banking, regarding the teaching of each of those subjects. Thus fortified and enlightened, the Commissioners proceeded to the making of the Statutes.

THE CHARTERS.

The Charters for the National University of Ireland and for its three Constituent Colleges give effect to the provisions of the Act. The Charters for the National University and for University College, Dublin, are necessarily new, as being for previously non-existent bodies. The old Charters for Queen's College, Cork, and Queen's College, Galway, are revoked, and new Charters are granted to them under their new names of Constituent Colleges.

CONSTITUTION AND FOUNDATION OF THE UNIVERSITY.

The University Charter starts by constituting and founding the University to have its seat in Dublin under the name of the National University of Ireland, "by which name"—so runs the legal phraseology—"the Chancellor and other members of the University for the time being shall be, and are hereby constituted, one body corporate, with perpetual succession and a common seal, and with power, without any further licence in mortmain, to take, purchase, and hold, and also to sell, grant, exchange, demise, and otherwise dispose of real and personal property." The value of real property to be so held

by the University in the United Kingdom is not to exceed £50,000 according to its value at the time of acquisition over and above the value of any site, buildings, and hereditaments used and occupied for the immediate purposes of the University. The value of real property to be similarly held by each of the Constituent Colleges is limited to £30,000.

THE VISITOR OF THE UNIVERSITY.

The King reserves to himself the right to be the Visitor of the University, acting through such Board of Visitors as he may from time to time appoint. He is also the Visitor of each Constituent College. As part of the visitorial authority the king has the right to direct an inspection of the University and the Constituent Colleges, of their buildings, laboratories, and general equipment, and also of the examinations, teaching, and other work done by the University and the Constituent Colleges. It is under this heading that it is provided that any President of a Constituent College, any University Professor, or any University Lecturer who is removed by the University from his office may appeal to the Visitor against such removal.² This appeal must be heard by a Board of four Visitors, and if they do not unanimously concur in such removal, it shall not take effect. The same visitorial rights that the king reserves to himself, he also reserves to his heirs and successors. From whatever point of view this section is regarded, it appears to be an admirable one.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNIVERSITY AND OF THE COLLEGES.

The members of the University are (1) every person who is an authority or a member of an authority of the University, (2) every member of a Constituent College, and (3) every matriculated student of the University. Women are eligible equally with men to be members of the University or of any

² See *Catholic University Bulletin*, February, 1910, pp. 97, 98.

authority of the University, and to hold any office, however high, or enjoy any advantage, however great, of the University. The same rule applies to the Colleges.

The members of each Constituent College are the President of the College, the members of the Governing Body of the College, the members of the Academic Council of the College, the registered graduates of the University who have been matriculated students in the College, and the students of the College who are matriculated students of the University, with the addition, in the case of University College, Dublin, of the registered graduates of the University who have been matriculated students in the Catholic University College, Dublin, or in the Cecilia Street Medical School, Dublin; in the case of University College, Cork, of the registered graduates of the University who have been matriculated students in Queen's College, Cork; and in the case of University College, Galway, of the registered graduates of the University who have been matriculated students in Queen's College, Galway.

AUTHORITIES OF THE UNIVERSITY.

The authorities of the University are (1) the Chancellor, (2) the Vice-Chancellor, (3) the Pro-Vice-Chancellors, (4) the Senate, (5) the General Board of Studies, (6) the Faculties, and (7) Convocation.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY.

The Chancellor is the head and chief officer of the University, and is entitled, if present, to preside over the meetings of the Senate, of any Committee appointed by the Senate, and of Convocation. His ³ tenure of office is for life or until his

³In dealing with the officers I have, for the sake of convenience, used masculine pronouns and possessive adjectives throughout; but it must be remembered that any office in the University or in a Constituent College may be held by a woman as well as by a man. In the language of the Statutes, "words importing the masculine gender include females."

resignation. It is provided that the first Chancellor shall be elected by the Senate, not necessarily from its own body, at its first meeting, and that all succeeding Chancellors shall be elected by Convocation.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR.

The Vice-Chancellor is the chief executive officer of the University. He may act as Chancellor during a vacancy in that office, and may act for the Chancellor, during the absence or inability of the latter, in all matters, except that he shall not be entitled to preside at a meeting of Convocation. By virtue of his office, the Vice-Chancellor is a member of Convocation, a member of the General Board of Studies and Chairman of that Board, and a member of each Faculty of the University. He is to be elected by the Senate from its own body for such period not exceeding five years as the Senate may determine, and he is eligible for re-election. He may resign his office at any time. No person shall continue to be Vice-Chancellor if he ceases to be a member of the Senate.

THE PRO-VICE-CHANCELLORS.

There is no limit to the number of Pro-Vice-Chancellors. At present there are three. A Pro-Vice-Chancellor may act as Vice-Chancellor during a vacancy in that office, and may act for the Vice-Chancellor during the absence or inability of the latter. The senior Pro-Vice-Chancellor present has a prior right to act as Vice-Chancellor, seniority depending on the date of election. If more than one Pro-Vice-Chancellor shall be elected at the same time, the resolution electing them shall declare their priority *inter se*. Each Pro-Vice-Chancellor is elected by the Senate from its own body for such period as the Senate may determine. A Pro-Vice-Chancellor may resign his office at any time. No person shall continue to be a Pro-Vice-Chancellor if he ceases to be a member of the Senate.

THE SENATE.

The present Senate, as nominated by the King in the Charter, is to hold office for five years from the 1st of November, 1909. It consists of 39 persons. Future Senates are to consist of 35 persons, made up as already described.⁴ Those persons who, by virtue of their office, are members of the Senate shall cease to be members thereof as soon as they cease to hold the qualifying office. Other members are Senators for five years, but on retirement are eligible for re-nomination or re-election, as the case may be. Any *non-ex-officio* member may resign at any time. Members of the Senate are eligible equally with other persons for appointment to paid offices in the University or in a Constituent College. They receive no salaries as Senators.

POWERS OF THE SENATE.

The Senate is the governing body of the University, and, subject to the provisions of the Act, of the Charter, and of the Statute, shall exercise all the powers and discretions of the University, and shall regulate and determine all matters concerning the University. Subject as before, the Senate has the following powers:

(a) To make statutes and regulations for the University, provided (i) that no statute or regulation shall be altered so as to change the status, powers, or constitution of any of the authorities of the University until such authority shall have had an opportunity of pronouncing an opinion upon the proposed change, and (ii) that regulations relating to degrees and examinations shall not be made without report from the General Board of Studies and the Faculties.

(b) To establish Faculties in all such departments of knowledge as the University may from time to time be able to equip and maintain in such a manner as will encourage original research, promote scholarship, and spread learning throughout the land.

⁴See *Catholic University Bulletin*, February, 1910, p. 111.

(c) To grant and confer Degrees and other Academic Distinctions in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

(d) To institute Professorships and Lectureships and any offices required by the University and, subject to the provisions of the Act and the Charter, to appoint and remove the holders of such offices.

(e) To appoint and remove the Presidents, Professors, and Lecturers of the Constituent Colleges, subject to the Irish Universities Act, 1908, and to the provisions of the Charter and the Charters of the Constituent Colleges.

(f) To institute and award studentships, scholarships, exhibitions, prizes, or other rewards.

(g) To accept from donors gifts of money, lands, or other property for the foundation of professorships, lectureships, studentships, or scholarships, or for the erection of buildings, or for the endowment of research, or for any other purpose or purposes connected with the University, upon such trusts and conditions, if any, as may be specified by the donors in regard to the foundation (including in the case of a professorship or lectureship any special provision to have effect in lieu of the general provisions of the charter as to the mode of appointment to or removal from such offices); provided always that nothing in such trusts or conditions is contrary to the provisions of the Act.

(h) To examine and inspect schools and other educational institutions and grant certificates of proficiency, and to provide such lectures and instruction for persons not being members of the University as the University may determine; and to co-operate, by means of joint boards or otherwise, with other universities and authorities for the conduct of matriculation examinations, for the examination and inspection of schools and other academic institutions, and for the extension of university teaching and influence in academic matters, and for such other purposes as the University may from time to time determine.

(i) To make contracts on behalf of the University in any manner authorized by law for making contracts by or on behalf

of companies incorporated under the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908.

(j) To do all such other acts and things, whether incidental to the powers aforesaid or not, as may be authorized in relation to the University or the Constituent Colleges, or may be requisite in order to further the objects of the University.

(k) To direct by regulations the form, custody, and use of the Common Seal.

(l) To deprive any graduate of the University who, in the opinion of the Senate, is guilty of scandalous conduct, of any Degree or Degrees conferred by the University, and of all privileges enjoyed by him or her as such graduate aforesaid.

As will be at once seen, these are very wide and comprehensive powers. All right-thinking people will heartily sympathize with the high ideal set up in sub-section (b) and will wish for its complete realization. Under sub-section (h) there is evidently contemplated in educational methods a great forward move, new in Ireland, whereby the University, by exercising through the Senate functions outside its own immediate province, may become a center of light and leading, a developer of latent Irish intellectuality. Beneath the somewhat cumbersome official verbiage of the sub-section there lurks great potentiality for good, and it is to be hoped that the powers thus conferred may, so far from being allowed to lie dormant, be exercised to the full for the betterment and uplift of educational methods, so that the new spirit which has recently come into Ireland may be strengthened and made productive of the happiest results.

PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE.

The Senate is to hold a stated ordinary meeting to be known as the yearly meeting in such month as its own regulations may determine, and on such day of that month as the Chancellor may appoint. Other ordinary meetings are to be convened at such times as are fixed by regulations, and at any other time either by direction of the Chancellor or upon a requisition addressed to him signed by not fewer than twelve Senators stating

the object for which the meeting is to be held. An extraordinary meeting of the Senate may be convened by direction of the Chancellor in case of any sudden emergency. Ordinary meetings require twenty-one days', extraordinary meetings, four days' notice. Any Senator who intends to bring forward at an ordinary meeting any business or to propose any person for election to any office must give to the Registrar notice of his intention at least fourteen days before the date of the meeting, and the Registrar in turn must give to every Senator at least seven days' notice of all business to be brought forward and of the name of any person to be proposed for election to any office. No business other than that of which due notice has been given may be transacted except such as may be brought forward by the Chancellor, or by his leave, as being in his opinion either of a merely formal character or of urgent importance. The notice of an extraordinary meeting shall state the business to be transacted and the emergency that renders the meeting necessary, and no other business may be transacted at the meeting.

Subject to the provisions of the Charter and the Statute, the Senate may, from time to time, make regulations for governing its own proceedings, including the determination of a quorum.

COMMITTEES.

The Senate shall appoint from its own body a Standing Committee and a Finance Committee, and may also appoint for particular purposes such other committees as it thinks fit. Of all committees the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, and the Registrar are *ex-officio* members. The Chancellor when presiding at a meeting of a committee has a casting as well as a deliberative vote.

THE STANDING COMMITTEE.

The Standing Committee shall consist of the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, the Presidents of the three Constituent Colleges, the Registrar, and not more than seven other Senators.

THE FINANCE COMMITTEE.

The duties of the Finance Committee are:

(a) To present an annual report to the Senate upon the finances of the University.

(b) From time to time to make such inspection and examination of the University accounts, and such inquiries as to expenditure, as it shall deem advisable, and to procure such expert assistance in relation thereto as may be found necessary.

(c) To make provision for the keeping of the account-books of the University in such form as the Treasury may direct for presentation to the Controller and Auditor-General.

(d) To transact any financial business that may be committed to it by the Senate.

(e) To make investments for the University, subject to review by the Senate.

ADVISORY COMMITTEES.

The Senate may also appoint Advisory Committees, consisting either wholly or partly of persons outside its own body, and may delegate to any such Advisory Committee such duties as it thinks fit, regarding financial, administrative, or other matters affecting the University, or any particular Faculty or Department of the University, or the management or supervision of any buildings or other property of the University. The Senate itself is to make regulations prescribing the procedure of Advisory Committees. All other Committees may, subject to such restrictions as may be imposed upon them by regulations of the Senate, make regulations for governing their own procedure, including the determination of a quorum and the time and place of their meetings.

THE GENERAL BOARD OF STUDIES.

A General Board of Studies must be appointed. It will consist of the following persons:

The Vice-Chancellor, who will be, in virtue of his office, Chairman of the Board; the Presidents of the Constituent Colleges; eight representatives of University College, Dublin; seven representatives of University College, Cork; six representatives of University College, Galway; and at least three extern examiners.

Care is to be taken in the selection of the representatives of the three Constituent Colleges that all the subjects of university instruction shall, so far as may be, receive due representation on the General Board of Studies.

In addition to those members of the Board already named, any "recognized" College shall be entitled to select from among its "recognized" teachers one or more representatives, as the Senate may determine, to be members of the General Board of Studies.

The Board shall hold office for three years, but its members shall be eligible for re-election or re-appointment. At any meeting of the Board nine members form a quorum, and in the absence of such quorum no business may be transacted. At all meetings the Vice-Chancellor has a casting as well as a deliberative vote. The chief Clerk of the University shall attend the meetings of the Board, and shall act as its Secretary. Subject to the provisions of the Charter, of the Statute, and of the Regulations of the University, the General Board of Studies may make regulations for the government of its own proceedings.

FUNCTIONS OF THE GENERAL BOARD OF STUDIES.

All matters which come before the Senate in reference to university studies and the courses for the various examinations held by the University shall be referred to, and be reported on by, the General Board of Studies; and such powers as the Senate deems fit in relation to university studies and the courses for the various examinations held by the University, may be delegated to the Board.

THE FACULTIES.

There shall be within the University the Faculties following:

1. Arts.
2. Philosophy and Sociology.
3. Celtic Studies.
4. Science.
5. Law.
6. Medicine.
7. Engineering and Architecture.
8. Commerce.

Each faculty shall consist of the Vice-Chancellor; the Dean of the Faculty, who shall be appointed annually by the members of the Faculty from among the Professors of the University in the subjects of the Faculty; and the Professors and the Lecturers of the University in the subjects of the Faculty.

The subjects shall be distributed among the various Faculties in the following manner:

I. *Faculty of Arts.*

Archæology.	Italian.
Art.	Latin.
Eastern Languages.	Logic.
Education.	Mathematics.
English.	Mathematical Physics.
Ethics.	Metaphysics.
French.	Music.
Geography.	Philology.
German.	Political Economy.
Greek.	Psychology.
History.	Spanish.
Irish.	

II. *Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology.*

Education.	Metaphysics.
Ethics.	National Economics.
History.	Political Economy.
History of Philosophy.	Psychology.
Logic.	Statistics.

III. *Faculty of Celtic Studies.*

Archæology.	Music.
Art.	Philology.
History.	Welsh and other Brythonic Languages.
Irish.	

IV. *Faculty of Science.*

Agriculture.	Experimental Physics.
Agricultural Chemistry.	Geology.
Anatomy.	Mathematics.
Applied Chemistry.	Mathematical Physics.
Botany.	Physiology.
Chemistry.	Veterinary Hygiene.
Electrical Engineering.	Zoology.

V. *Faculty of Law.*

Constitutional Law.	Law of Real and Personal Property.
Jurisprudence.	Law of Public and Private Wrongs.
Law of Contracts.	Roman Law.

VI. *Faculty of Medicine.*

Anatomy.	Mental Diseases.
Botany.	Midwifery and Gynaecology.
Chemistry.	Ophthalmology.
Dental Subjects.	Pathology.
Experimental Physics.	Physiology.
Hygiene.	

Materia Medica.	Public Health.
Medical Jurisprudence.	Surgery.
Medicine.	Zoology.

VII. *Faculty of Engineering and Architecture.*

Architecture.	Experimental Physics.
Chemistry.	Geology.
Engineering.	Mathematics.
Electrical Engineering.	Mathematical Physics.

VIII. *Faculty of Commerce.*

Accountancy.	History.
Banking.	Italian.
Commerce.	Law.
English.	National Economics.
French.	Political Economy.
Geography.	Spanish.
German.	Statistics.

Each Faculty shall act as a Board of Studies for its own Department, reporting to the General Board of Studies and acting under its supervision. Faculty meetings shall be called by the Dean, subject to the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. Subject to the provisions of the Charter and to the Statutes and Regulations of the University, each faculty may make regulations governing its own proceedings.

CONVOCATION.

The Convocation of the University shall consist of the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, the members of the Senate, the Professors and Lecturers of the University, and all registered Graduates who are enrolled as members of Convocation. The Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, the Senators, and the Professors and Lecturers of the University are *ex-officio* members, and are entitled, as such, to be members only so long as they continue to hold the offices by virtue of which they are qualified

to be members. The Roll of Convocation is to be kept in such manner as Convocation may direct. This Roll shall be conclusive evidence that any person whose name appears thereon, at the time of his claiming to vote as a member of Convocation, is so entitled to vote, and that any person whose name does not then appear thereon is not so entitled. The Clerk of Convocation is in the first instance to be appointed by the Dublin Commissioners, and after their powers determine he is to be appointed by the Senate. His duties are to keep the Roll of Convocation, to issue notices for all meetings of Convocation when convened by proper authority, to give certain notices in connection with the election of Chancellor and Senators, and to perform such other duties as shall from time to time be prescribed by Convocation with the approval of the Senate. The salary of the clerk is £100 a year. The first clerk is Mr. Charles F. Doyle, K. C. Graduates of the Royal University of Ireland, who, under Section 13 of the Irish Universities Act, 1908, are registered as graduates of the National University of Ireland, are entitled to enrolment as members of Convocation on the same conditions as if their degrees had been conferred by the National University.

The first meeting of Convocation shall be held on a day to be fixed by the Chancellor, but shall not be later than six months from the dissolution of the Royal University. At such first meeting Convocation shall elect a Chairman, who shall continue in office for such time as Convocation shall determine. A meeting of Convocation shall be held at least once in each year on a date to be fixed by the Senate, and meetings may be held at such other times as the Senate or the Chancellor shall appoint. At meetings of Convocation forty members shall form a quorum, except at meetings held for the election of a Chancellor or Senators, when five will be sufficient for a quorum.

The powers of Convocation are to elect a person to be Chancellor of the University in succession to the first or any subsequent Chancellor; to elect its own Chairman, who shall, in the absence of the Chancellor, be entitled to preside at its meetings; to elect eight of its own members as its representatives

on the Senate, after the expiration of the period of office of the present Senate; to discuss and pronounce an opinion on any matter whatsoever relative to the University, including any matters referred to it by the Senate; to make from time to time regulations for the government of its own proceedings, subject to the provisions of the Charter and of the Statutes and the Regulations of the University; and to make representations to the Senate on any matter affecting the University.

PROFESSORS OF THE UNIVERSITY AND LECTURERS OF THE
UNIVERSITY.

The following persons, and no others, shall be deemed to be and shall be entitled to be styled Professors of the University or Lecturers of the University, as the case may be:—

(a) The holders of Professorships and Lectureships endowed out of the income of the University or of any Constituent College derived from public funds, including persons holding such offices by virtue of temporary appointment under Section 15 of the Act, and the holders of such other Professorships and Lectureships as may be instituted by the University.

(b) The holders of any other Professorships and Lectureships the appointment to which is vested in the University.

(c) The holders of Professorships and Lectureships founded in connection with the University or in connection with any Constituent College the appointment to which is not vested in the University, if they have been recognized by the Senate as Professors or Lecturers of the University: provided that such recognition shall not be accorded unless the University is directly represented on the Body by whom the appointment is made or confirmed.

The Senate may also contract with persons of eminence in any subject of study, not being Professors or Lecturers of the University, for special or occasional Courses of Lectures to be given in the University or in any of the Colleges in such subject, for such remuneration, and upon such terms as may seem fit.

As already explained,⁵ the appointment of the first set of Professors and Lecturers is vested in the Dublin Commissioners. After the powers of the Commissioners shall have ceased the Senate shall appoint the several Professors and Lecturers of the University, including the University Professors and the University Lecturers in the Constituent Colleges. The Senate may, on the recommendation of the Academic Council of any Constituent College, confer the title of Reader upon any Lecturer of the University.

Saving the rights of existing officers, every Professor and Lecturer appointed before the expiration of seven years from the dissolution of the Royal University, that is, from 1st of November, 1909, shall, subject to good conduct and the due fulfilment of his duties, hold office until the expiration of that period. Saving the said rights, every Professor appointed after the expiration of that period, except the Professor of Jurisprudence and Roman Law, the Professor of Constitutional Law and the Law of Public and Private Wrongs, and the Professor of the Law of Property and the Law of Contracts in University College, Dublin, shall, subject to good conduct and the due fulfilment of his duties, hold office until he shall have attained the age of 65 years, and may thereafter be continued in office for five further years, provided that such further continuance in office is sanctioned by the Senate annually, and, if the Professor is attached to a Constituent College, is approved of by the Governing Body and by the President of such College. The excepted Professors shall hold office for seven years.

Every Professor of the University shall, upon entering into office, sign the following declaration:

“I, *A. B.*, do hereby solemnly and sincerely declare and engage that I will faithfully discharge the duties of Professor of, in the National University of Ireland, and that I will not, in lecturing, teaching, examining, or in the performance of the other duties attached to my Chair, make any statement, or use any language that would be disrespectful to the religious opinions of any of my class.”

⁵ *Catholic University Bulletin*, February, 1910, pp. 97 and 109.

Every Professor and every Lecturer shall:

(a) in respect of the lectures to be given by him, conform to the Regulations applicable to his Chair.

(b) give to the students attending his ordinary lectures assistance in their studies, by advice, by informal instruction, by occasional and periodical examination, and otherwise, as he may judge to be expedient. For receiving students who may desire such assistance, such stated times shall be appointed during the period in which he lectures, as he shall think fit to assign.

Every full-time Professor shall, so far as it is compatible with the other duties of his Chair, devote himself to research and the advancement of knowledge.

As the Commissioners had no means of estimating accurately either the amount of money necessary to meet the compensation payable under the Act, or the annual amount necessary to carry on the work of the University, especially with regard to the expense of the University Examinations, they found themselves obliged to leave the Statute incomplete in the matter of instituting Professorships in the University. They state in their report that at least one year's experience will be required, before they can determine whether the income of the University is sufficient to meet the stipends which should be attached to the Professorships necessary to enable the University to fulfil the functions of the University constituted by the Charter. They are, however, quite emphatic in the expression of their opinion that Professorships and Lectureships in the University itself, as distinct from the Professorships and Lectureships in the Constituent Colleges, are contemplated by the Charter. The inference is that, if at the end of a year the funds allow, they will proceed to institute Professorships and Lectureships in the University proper and make appointments thereto, and that, if the funds do not allow this course to be adopted, Parliament will have to be asked for a further grant. The Commissioners however, as we shall presently see, have appointed the clerical staff of the University and the teaching and other staffs of the Constituent Colleges.

STUDENTS.

Every person who shall have passed the Matriculation examination, shall have paid to the University the prescribed Matriculation fee, and shall have signed a declaration to the University in the prescribed form to observe and obey its statutes and regulations, shall be a matriculated student of the University.

REGISTERS OF THE UNIVERSITY.

A register of graduates in a prescribed form shall be kept, and shall contain the name and address of each graduate, the degrees which have been conferred upon him, the dates on which they were so conferred, and such other particulars as shall be prescribed. This Register shall be conclusive evidence of the right of every person whose name shall appear therein to the Degree therein stated to have been conferred upon him. There shall also be in a prescribed form registers of the Authorities of the University, of the Professors of the University, of the Lecturers of the University, and of other members of the University.

THE REGISTRAR.

Mr. Joseph M'Grath, LL. D., is appointed by the Charter to be the first Registrar of the University. Mr. M'Grath has been for many years one of the two Secretaries of the Royal University of Ireland. His salary in his new post is £1,000 a year. The salary of his successors is to be £500 a year, rising by annual increments of £25 to £700 a year.

The Registrar is a very important official. His duties, which are very clearly defined and are therefore more or less of the routine order, are nevertheless both intricate and comprehensive. It is his business, among other things, to keep the register of graduates and the other registers of the University; to provide for the safe custody of all such muniments, records, writings, and documents as may be entrusted to him,

and, when directed by the Senate, to lodge in a bank or in other custody muniments and securities of the University; to see to the publication of the lists of successful candidates at each University examination; to prepare the testimoniums for Degrees and the Diplomas and Certificates evidencing the other Academic Distinctions intended to be conferred; to have charge of the University buildings and to present to the Standing Committee an annual report as to their condition and as to any repairs, alterations, or additions that he shall be of opinion may be required; to superintend and control the keeping of the account-books of the University; to present once a year to the Finance Committee for submission to the Senate a statement of the income and expenditure of the University and also an estimate of the income and expenditure for the coming year; to check all accounts payable by the University; to supervise matriculation and other examinations at examination centers outside the Constituent or Recognized Colleges; to supervise the preparation and publication of the University Calendar; to be responsible for the summoning of all meetings and be the administrative officer for the carrying out of any resolutions adopted at such meetings; to appoint and dismiss servants for the care of the University buildings; and to conduct the correspondence of the University.

CLERKS.

To assist the registrar in the discharge of his duties there are four clerks—a Chief Clerk, an Accountant Clerk, and two others. Besides assisting the Registrar, the Chief Clerk is the confidential clerk of the Senate, of the General Board of Studies, and of the Faculties. He has to attend all the meetings of these bodies, and of their committees, to record the attendance of members at all such meetings, and to keep the minutes of the proceedings. The salaries attaching to the clerkships are—Chief Clerk, £350 a year rising by yearly increments of £10 to £450; Accounting Clerk, £200 a year rising by yearly increments of £10 to £250; third Clerk, £150 a year rising by

yearly increments of £10 to £200; and fourth Clerk £100 a year rising by yearly increments of £10 to £150. Those appointed to each of those offices, respectively, are Mr. Alister P. M'Allister, M.A.; Mr. F. H. Wiber; Mr. Matthew F. Kane; and Mr. Alexander A. McCarthy.

SUBJECTS OF STUDY.

The subjects which shall respectively be studied for the several Degrees and other Academic Distinctions of the University shall be prescribed by Regulations. Approved courses of study may be pursued by a student either in the University or in a Constituent College or in a Recognized College or partly in the University and partly in one or more of the Constituent or Recognized Colleges or partly in one of the Constituent Colleges or Recognized Colleges and partly in another or others of them, or, in respect of such subjects of prescribed instruction as cannot conveniently be pursued in a College, or in respect of other special subjects, and in respect of Courses of Study for Post-Graduate students, in such other places as may be prescribed by Regulations.

Courses of study which may be so approved may consist of any Courses of prescribed instruction whether the same shall be Courses of lectures; Courses of catechetical instruction; Courses of clinical instruction in hospitals or other like institutions; Courses of practical work in laboratories, railway, manufacturing, or other workshops, works, or offices, or in mines, or on the open ground; Courses of research in any University or College, Public Office, or other Record office or Muniment room, library, museum, or other place, or amongst ancient or other monuments, whether any such University or other place be in the United Kingdom or in any other country; provided the same shall be undertaken or carried on by the direction or under the supervision of the prescribed professor or lecturer.

The Senate may accept the periods of study passed by students of the University at other Universities as equivalent to such parts of Approved Courses of Study as the Senate may by regu-

lation determine, and may accept particular Courses of Study in special subjects taken in other places by students who are pursuing Courses of Study in the University or in a Constituent College or in a Recognized College, as component parts of Approved Courses of Study, provided that the Senate is satisfied that the instruction given in such special subjects is adequate.

Courses of study proposed by a Constituent College for its own students must be approved by the Senate, and, in case of non-approval, the Senate shall by Regulations prescribe courses of study for that College. The Senate may also approve a course of study of a university type taken in a Recognized College as equivalent in part or in whole to an approved course of study taken at the University.

The duration of approved periods of study when pursued at the University or at a Constituent College shall be measured by the Terms of the University. The duration of a period of study when pursued elsewhere than in the University or in a Constituent College or Recognized College shall be prescribed by the Senate, but no such period shall be less than the average length of a Term of the University.

THE TERMS OF THE UNIVERSITY.

There are three terms in each year, called respectively the Michaelmas Term, the Hilary Term, and the Trinity Term. The commencement and termination of the Terms shall be fixed by regulations.

EXAMINATIONS.

Detailed instructions are given for the conduct of examinations. Examinations may be held in the University or in a Constituent College or in a Recognized College, or in any other place which the Senate may deem fit and convenient for this purpose.

THE MATRICULATION EXAMINATION.

For all students who desire to enter the University there shall be a common Matriculation examination, except for those who are exempted. The subjects of study for this examination, the conditions for passing it, and other details in connection with it shall be proposed by the General Board of Studies, shall be submitted to the Academic Council of each Constituent College, and shall be prescribed by the Senate by Regulations made after consideration of the Report of the General Board of Studies and of the objections, if any, of the Academic Council of any Constituent College. The examination shall be conducted by such of the University Professors and University Lecturers in the Constituent Colleges as may be selected by the Senate for that purpose. If Assistant Examiners are required, they are to be appointed by the Standing Committee. The papers set in any subject for the Matriculation examination must be submitted to the Teachers of that subject in each of the Constituent Colleges, and are subject to the approval of the Teachers in that subject in at least two of the Constituent Colleges.

The students who may be exempted from this entrance examination are those who have already passed the Matriculation or any other examination of any University in Ireland or elsewhere, or any examination of any public educational authority in the king's dominions, provided that all such examinations are recognized by Regulations of the University as exempting from its own Matriculation examination.

EXAMINATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO MATRICULATION.

For the examination of candidates for Degrees or for University Studentships, Scholarships, or other Prizes, at least one independent and extern examiner shall be appointed by the Senate in each subject or group of subjects of study. All such examinations shall be conducted by Professors of the University

and Extern Examiners, with such Lecturers of the University and Recognized Teachers as the Senate may appoint. The examination for Degrees of the University held in Constituent Colleges shall be conducted by such Professors and Lecturers of the College as the Senate shall appoint, in association with Extern Examiners. The Senate shall determine by Regulations the examinations passed by students of the National University at other Universities which shall be accepted as equivalent to particular examinations in the University. Examiners, including Extern Examiners, shall be appointed by the Senate annually. An Extern Examiner who has held office for three years shall not be eligible for re-appointment, until after such interval being not less than one year as the Senate may by Regulations prescribe. Extern Examiners shall be paid such remuneration as may be prescribed by Regulations. If a University Professor or University Lecturer attached to any Constituent College examines students other than those of the College, he is entitled to extra remuneration for so doing.

The following degrees may be conferred by the University:—

A. In the Faculty of Arts.

Bachelor of Arts (B. A.).

Bachelor of Music (B. Mus.).

Master of Arts (M. A.).

Doctor of Literature (D. Litt.).

Doctor of Music (D. Mus.).

B. In the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology.

Doctor of Philosophy (D. Phil.).

C. In the Faculty of Celtic Studies.

Master of Celtic Studies (M. Litt. Celt.).

Doctor of Celtic Studies (D. Litt. Celt.).

D. In the Faculty of Science.

Bachelor of Science (B. Sc.).

Bachelor of Agricultural Science (B. Agr. Sc.).

Master of Science (M. Sc.).

Master of Agricultural Science (M. Agr. Sc.).

Doctor of Science (D. Sc.).

E. In the Faculty of Law.

Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.).

Doctor of Laws (LL. D.).

F. In the Faculty of Medicine.

Bachelor of Medicine (M. B.).

Bachelor of Surgery (B. Ch.).

Bachelor of Obstetrics (B. A. O.).

Bachelor of Science, Public Health (B. Sc., Public Health).

Master of Surgery (M. Ch.).

Master of Obstetrics (M. A. O.).

Doctor of Medicine (M. D.).

Doctor of Science, Public Health (D. Sc., Public Health).

Bachelor of Dental Surgery (B. D.S.).

Master of Dental Surgery (M. D. S.).

G. In the Faculty of Engineering.

Bachelor of Engineering (B. E.).

Bachelor of Architecture (B. Arch.).

Master of Engineering (M. E.).

Master of Architecture (M. Arch.).

H. In the Faculty of Commerce.

Bachelor of Commerce (B. Comm.).

Master of Commerce (M. Comm.).

The following Degrees shall be known as Primary Degrees:—

Bachelor of Arts; Bachelor of Music; Bachelor of Science; Bachelor of Agricultural Science; Bachelor of Medicine; Bachelor of Surgery; Bachelor of Obstetrics; Bachelor of Dental Surgery; Bachelor of Engineering; Bachelor of Architecture; Bachelor of Commerce.

To receive any Primary Degree a student must have pursued, after Matriculation, an approved course of study for at least nine terms in the subjects prescribed to be studied for such Degree, and must have passed at least two University examinations in those subjects, viz., the First University Examination

and the Degree Examination. The nine terms need not necessarily be consecutive. In the case of a candidate for a Primary Degree in Arts the Senate has power to remit, for grave cause of absence, one or two—but not more than two—terms. The Senate has also power to admit undergraduate students who have kept terms at another university, and to count the terms so kept as terms kept at the National University, provided that the other University has been approved for the purpose by the Senate, that the whole time of attendance at lectures or other courses of instruction is in every case not less than that which is required by the Statutes for obtaining a Degree, and that at least three terms have been kept in the National University.

To receive the Degree of Bachelor of Architecture a student must have pursued an approved course of study of at least nine terms, must also for a period of at least two years have been engaged in practical architectural work, making in all a period of five years from the date of Matriculation, and must have passed the prescribed examinations.

A student can be admitted to the Degree of Bachelor of Dental Surgery only at the end of a period of four years from the date of Matriculation, and during that period he must have pursued an approved course of study of at least nine terms, and he must also pass the prescribed examinations.

The Degrees of M. B., B. Ch., and B. A. O. shall be conferred only at the same time and after the same course of study. To be admitted to the final examination for these degrees a student must have completed the prescribed course of study in the Faculty of Medicine, extending over a period of at least five academic years from the date of his registration as a student of medicine by the General Medical Council, must have passed the prescribed examinations, and must have attained the age of 21 years. Further, these degrees can not be conferred upon any person who has not attended at the University or at one or more of its Constituent Colleges during at least three years the courses of study prescribed for such degrees. The Senate may accept, for not more than two years of the required five, courses of study pursued in any other University or School of Medicine recognized for this purpose by the Senate.

HIGHER DEGREES.

To receive the degree of Bachelor of Laws a candidate must have received the degree of Bachelor of Arts at least two years previously, must have pursued an approved course of study in the Faculty of Law of at least nine terms, of which at least six shall be subsequent to his passing the examination for the Degree of B. A., and must have passed the prescribed examinations.

To receive the Degree of Bachelor of Science, Public Health, a candidate must have received the Degrees of M. B., B. Ch., and B. A. O. at least one year previously, must have pursued an approved course of study in the Faculty of Medicine, and must have passed the prescribed examination.

A candidate for the Degree of Master in any Faculty other than the Faculties of Arts, of Celtic Studies, and of Science, must have passed the examinations prescribed for the Degree, and either written and presented a satisfactory Dissertation, or complied with such conditions, and performed such other exercises, as may be prescribed for the purpose of qualifying for the Degree. Such candidate shall not, however, "be eligible to obtain any of the Degrees hereinafter mentioned until not less than the respective periods hereinafter specified shall have elapsed from the time of conferring on the candidate the Primary Degree in the same Faculty, that is to say:—

Master of Engineering, three years after Bachelor of Engineering.

Master of Architecture, three years after Bachelor of Architecture.

Master of Surgery, three years after Bachelor of Surgery.

Master of Obstetrics, three years after Bachelor of Obstetrics.

Master of Dental Surgery, three years after Bachelor of Dental Surgery.

Master of Agricultural Science, three years after Bachelor of Agricultural Science.

Master of Commerce, three years after Bachelor of Commerce.

Provided that the Degree of Master of Surgery or Master of Obstetrics may be obtained in two years by a Graduate in Medicine or Surgery who is also a Graduate in Arts or in Science." ⁶

To receive the Degree of Master of Arts—

- I. A Bachelor of Arts of at least one year's standing must, after graduation, have pursued for one year an approved Post-Graduate Course in Arts, must have written and presented a satisfactory Dissertation, based upon the work done or study pursued by him during the year, and must have performed such other exercises as may be prescribed to that end.
- II. A Bachelor of Arts of at least two years' standing must, after graduation, have written and presented a satisfactory dissertation, must have passed a special examination for the Degree, and must have performed such other exercises as may be prescribed to that end.

To receive the Degree of Master of Celtic Studies—

- I. A Bachelor of Arts of at least one year's standing must, after graduation, have pursued for one year a prescribed Post-Graduate course in Celtic Studies, must have written and presented a satisfactory Dissertation, based upon the work done or the study pursued by him during the year, and must have performed such other exercises as may be prescribed to that end.
- II. A Bachelor of Arts of at least two years' standing must, after graduation, have written and presented a satisfactory Dissertation, must have passed a special examination for the Degree, and must have performed such other exercises as may be prescribed to that end.

To receive the Degree of Master of Science—

- I. A Bachelor of Science of at least one year's standing must, after graduation, have pursued for one year in the Faculty of Science an approved Post-Graduate

⁶ Statute for the National University of Ireland, Chapter XLIII, Section 4, pp. 39-40.

Course of study, must have written and presented a satisfactory Dissertation on the work done or study pursued during the year, and must have performed such other exercises as may be prescribed to that end.

- II. A Bachelor of Science of at least two years' standing must, after graduation, have written and presented a satisfactory Dissertation, the subject of which shall have been approved by the Dean of the Faculty concerned and by the Board of Studies, must have passed a special examination for the Degree, and must have performed such other exercises as may be prescribed to that end.

THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR.

"A candidate shall not be eligible to obtain any of the Degrees hereinafter mentioned until not less than the respective periods hereinafter specified shall have elapsed from the time of conferring the Primary Degree mentioned, that is to say:—

Doctor of Literature, five years after Bachelor of Arts.

Doctor of Philosophy, five years after Bachelor of Arts.

Doctor of Celtic Studies, five years after Bachelor of Arts.

Doctor of Science, five years after Bachelor of Science or Bachelor of Arts.

Doctor of Laws, five years after Bachelor of Laws.

Doctor of Medicine, three years after Bachelor of Medicine.

Doctor of Science, Public Health, three years after Bachelor of Science, Public Health.

Doctor of Music, five years after Bachelor of Music.

Provided that the Degree of Doctor of Medicine may be obtained in two years by a Graduate in Medicine and Surgery who is also a Graduate in Arts or Science." ⁷

In the Faculties of Arts, Celtic Studies, Philosophy, Science, Law, and Music, the Degree of Doctor shall be given only on

⁷ Statute for the National University of Ireland, Chapter XLIII, Section 8, p. 41.

original work, which shall be supplemented by an examination, unless, in the judgment of the General Board of Studies, acting on the advice of examiners who are to be appointed by itself and who may or may not be members of the Faculty concerned, the examination, in view of the excellence of the original work submitted by the candidate, may be wholly or in part dispensed with. The work to be submitted by a candidate for the Degree of Doctor of Literature, of Celtic Studies, of Philosophy, or of Science must be a published work, which either shows original thought, or embodies such results of personal research as to be in the judgment of the examiners worthy of recognition by the University as adding to the sum of existing knowledge of the subject treated.

The work to be submitted by a candidate for the Degree of Doctor of Laws must be a contribution to the advancement of the study of Law or of the Science of Law, which in the judgment of the examiners is worthy of recognition by such Degree.

The Degree of Doctor of Medicine, or Doctor of Science, Public Health, may be conferred either after examination, or on the submission of published work embodying the results of personal observations or original research, which, in the judgment of the examiners of the Medical Faculty, appointed by the General Board of Studies, shall be considered satisfactory as a qualification for the Degree.

A candidate for the Degree of Doctor of Music must submit an original composition, of a form and structure to be prescribed by Regulations. If the work submitted by the candidate is approved by the examiners, he will be admitted to an examination in which he must answer in subjects to be prescribed by Regulations. There shall be, in addition, a practical examination at which the candidate will be required to perform certain prescribed pieces, and also to perform at sight, on certain prescribed instruments.

OTHER RECIPIENTS OF DEGREES.

Degrees may also be granted to persons who hold offices in the University or in the Constituent Colleges, as Professors, Lecturers, or otherwise; to Graduates of other Universities whom the University may decide to admit to Degrees of equal or similar rank; to students who shall have carried on independent research in the University or in a Constituent College; and to approved persons who shall be selected for Honorary Degrees.

ACADEMIC DISTINCTIONS.

In addition to Degrees, the University may confer Academic Distinctions. Diplomas in the Faculty of Arts may be granted to Matriculated Students of the University who have passed certain examinations, and Diplomas may also be granted in Public Health, Celtic Studies, Commerce, Journalism, Agriculture, Music, Applied Science, Education, Architecture, and Veterinary Hygiene. Certificates may under certain conditions be granted in Commerce and in Music.

STUDENTSHIPS.

Every year three Travelling Studentships, each of the annual value of £200 and tenable for three years, will be offered for competition among Graduates of the University of not more than three years' standing. Each of those valuable prizes is subject to the condition that the holder shall, during each of the three years, apply himself to research in the subject in which he obtained the studentship or in some cognate line of research approved of by the General Board of Studies. This research must be pursued outside of Ireland in such places as the Senate shall direct, and under the direction of a Professor of a University, or of some other person selected by the student himself and approved of by or for the Senate. A satisfactory detailed report of the work on which the student has been en-

gaged, and a satisfactory certificate from the person under whose direction it has been conducted, are conditions of the continuance of the studentship for a second and a third year. These studentships may be given for proficiency in subjects of secular education only, and must not be given in respect of any subject of religious instruction.

FEES.

The Senate may demand and receive such fees as it from time to time appoints.

DISCIPLINE.

For the due maintenance of good order and discipline within the University, the University shall make such Regulations as it may deem expedient in regard to the wearing of academical dress; the rendering of assistance and obedience to all persons in authority; the observance of decorum at the meetings of the University; the definition and determination of offences; the penalties on offenders; and the manner in which pecuniary penalties and fines shall be collected and disposed of.

ADMINISTRATION OF FUNDS.

To guard against any possible corrupt use of the endowment or other funds of the University, the Charter provides that "except as aforesaid, and except by way of prize, reward, special grant, or remuneration for services rendered or to be rendered in the past, present, or future, respectively, the University shall not make any gift, division, or bonus in money unto or between any of its members." A similar inhibition is placed on each of the Constituent Colleges.

THE CONSTITUENT COLLEGES: THE PRESIDENTS.

Turning now from the Charter and the Statute of the University, we may survey, very briefly, the Charters and the Statutes of the Constituent Colleges.

Each College is to be a teaching body. Each has a President of its own. The President of University College, Dublin, named in the Charter to hold office for six years, is Denis Joseph Coffey, M. A., M. B., B. Ch. His salary and the salary of his successors is to be £1,500 a year, with residence, fuel, and light. Until an official residence has been provided for him he is entitled to £300 a year in lieu thereof. Any President after the first in any of the Colleges is to hold office until he shall have attained the age of 70.

The salary of the President of University College, Cork, is £1,200 a year, with residence, fuel, and light. The first President, named in the Charter, to hold office in accordance with the provisions of the Act, is Bertram Coghill Alan Windle, M. A., D. Sc., M. D., F. R. S.

The salary of the President of University College, Galway, is £800 a year, with residence, fuel, and light. In addition, if he is appointed a Professor, he is entitled to two-thirds of the Professor's salary and to all the fees payable to such Professor. The first President, named in the Charter, to hold office in accordance with the provisions of the Act, is Alexander Anderson, M. A., LL. D.

The powers and duties of each President are set forth in very full detail. Some of these have been already mentioned.⁸ Amongst other things he has to reside in the College at least 210 days in each year.

GOVERNING BODIES OF THE COLLEGES.

The first Governing Body of each Constituent College is named in its Charter, and is to hold office for three years and three months from 1st of November, 1909. That of University College, Dublin, consists of 30 persons; of University College, Cork, of 29 persons; of University College, Galway, of 26 persons. The future Governing Bodies are to be made up thus:—

⁸ See *Catholic University Bulletin*, February, 1910, p. 98.

University College, Dublin:—The President, 1; Nominated by the Crown, 4; Appointed by the Senate of the University, 3; Professors of the College elected by the Academic Council, 6; Graduates of the University who are members of the College elected by those Graduates, 6; The Lord Mayor of the City of Dublin, 1; Elected by the Council of the County of Dublin, 1; Elected by the Members of the General Council of County Councils, 8; Co-opted, 4; in all, 34.

University College, Cork:—The President, 1; Nominated by the Crown, 3; Appointed by the Senate of the University, 2; Professors of the College elected by the Academic Council, 6; Graduates of the University who are members of the College elected by those Graduates, 4; The Lord Mayor of Cork, 1; The Mayor of Limerick, 1; The Mayor of Waterford, 1; Elected by the County Council of Cork, 1; Elected by the County Council of Waterford, 1; Elected by the County Council of Kerry, 1; Elected by the County Council of Limerick, 1; Elected by the Council Councils of Tipperary, 1; Co-opted, 4; in all, 28.

University College, Galway:—The President, 1; Nominated by the Crown, 3; Appointed by the Senate of the University, 4; Professors of the College elected by the Academic Council, 4; Graduates of the University who are members of the College elected by those Graduates, 4; Elected by the County Council of Galway, 1; Elected by the Urban District Council of Galway, 1; Elected by the County Council of Leitrim, 1; Elected by the County Council of Mayo, 1; Elected by the County Council of Roscommon, 1; Elected by the County Council of Sligo, 1; Elected by the County Council of Clare, 1; Co-opted, 3; in all, 26.

The Governing Body of each College possesses as regards the College powers somewhat analogous to those possessed by the Senate of the National University as regards the University. One particular power is to establish, maintain, or license halls of residence or other places for the residence of students. In this connection each Governing Body shall appoint two or more Deans of Residence and one or more Lady Superintendents as Officers of Residence, and shall require every student of the

College to enter under such one of these Officers of Residence, subject to the direction of his parents or guardians, as he may choose. These Officers of Residence shall exercise supervision over the general conduct of the students outside the precincts of the College, and shall see that students not living with parents or guardians are in a hostel or lodging house recognized by the College.

THE ACADEMIC COUNCILS.

The Academic Council of each College consists of the President and the Professors of the College, with such Lecturers of the College as may be co-opted by the President and Professors. Among the functions of the Academic Council the following may be particularized:—

- (a) To elect representatives on the Governing Body.
- (b) To manage and carry out the curriculum, instruction, and education afforded by the College.
- (c) To make recommendations for the Scholarships and other Prizes of the College.
- (d) To regulate and carry out the discipline of the students of the College.

FACULTIES IN THE COLLEGES.

University College, Dublin, has eight Faculties, namely, Arts; Philosophy and Sociology; Celtic Studies; Science, including Technology and Agriculture; Law; Medicine; Engineering and Architecture; and Commerce.

University College, Cork, has seven Faculties, namely, Arts, including Philosophy and Journalism; Celtic Studies; Science, including Technology and Agriculture; Law; Medicine; Engineering and Architecture; and Commerce.

University College, Galway, has six Faculties, namely, Arts, including Philosophy; Celtic Studies; Science; Law; Medicine; and Engineering.

OFFICERS OF THE COLLEGES.

In addition to Professors, Lecturers, Assistants, and Demonstrators, University College, Dublin, has as officers a Registrar, a Secretary (and Bursar), and a Librarian; University College, Cork, a Registrar, a Secretary, and a Librarian; and University College, Galway, a Registrar, a Bursar, and a Librarian. Minute instructions are given for the duties to be discharged by each of those officers.

SCHOLARSHIPS, PRIZES, AND OTHER REWARDS.

Part of the annual income of each College must be allocated by the Governing Body for the provision of Scholarships, Prizes, and other Rewards. In the Colleges at Cork and Galway a specified sum has also to be set aside each year for the payment of Pensions to retired Presidents, Professors, and other officers of the College.

LISTS OF OFFICES, OFFICERS, AND SALARIES.

The Professors, Lecturers, and other officers who have been so far appointed in the Constituent Colleges, with the yearly salaries attached to their offices, are the following:—

University College, Dublin.

*Professorship of Greek, Rev. Henry Browne, S.J., M.A., £600; *Professorship of Latin, Mr. P. Semple, M.A., £700; *Professorship of Mathematics, Mr. H. C. M'Weeney, M.A., £700; *Professorship of English Literature, —, £500; *Professorship of English Language and Philology, Rev. George O'Neill, S.J., M.A., £400; *Professorship of French and Romance Philology, M. Edouard Cadic, D.Litt., £500; *Professorship of History, Mr. John M. O'Sullivan, M.A., Ph.D., £500; *Professorship of the Theory and Practice of Education, Rev. T. Corcoran, S.J., B.A., £400; *Professor-

ship of Ethics and Politics, Rev. M. Cronin, D.D., M.A., £500; *Professorship of Logic and Psychology, Rev. J. Shine, M.A., £400; *Professorship of Metaphysics, Mr. W. Magennis, M.A., £700; *Professorship of Celtic Archæology, Mr. R. A. Stewart Macalister, M.A., F.S.A., £600; *Professorship of Early (including Mediaeval) Irish History, Mr. John Mac Neill, B.A., £600; *Professorship of Early (including Mediaeval) Irish Language and Literature, Mr. Osborn Bergin, M.A., Ph.D., £600; *Professorship of Modern Irish Language and Literature, Mr. Douglas Hyde, M.A., LL.D., £600; *Professorship of Chemistry, Mr. Hugh Ryan, M.A., D.Sc., £750; *Professorship of Geology, Mr. Henry J. Seymour, B.A., £500; *Professorship of Experimental Physics, Mr. J. A. M'Clelland, D.Sc., £800; *Professorship of Mathematical Physics, Mr. Arthur W. Conway, M.A., D.Sc., £600; *Professorship of Zoology, Mr. George Sigerson, M.D., £600; *Professorship of Anatomy, Mr. E. P. M'Loughlin, M.B., £800; *Professorship of Physiology and Histology, Mr. B. J. Collingwood, M.D., £700; *Professorship of Pathology and Bacteriology, Mr. E. J. M'Weeney, M.D., £600; Professorship of Hygiene and Medical Jurisprudence, Mr. J. M. Meenan, M.D., £250; Professorship of Materia Medica and Therapeutics, Mr. Martin Dempsey, M.D., £200; Professorship of Medicine, Sir Christopher Nixon, Bart., M.D., £250; Professorship of Midwifery and Gynaecology, Mr. Alfred Smith, M.B., F.R.C.S., £200; Professorship of Surgery, Mr. J. S. McArdle, M.Ch., F.R.C.S., £300; Professorship of Jurisprudence and Roman Law, Mr. James A. Mur-naghan, LL.D., £250; Professorship of Constitutional Law and the Law of Public and Private Wrongs, Mr. J. G. Swift MacNeill, K.C., M.P., £250; Professorship of the Law of Property and of the Law of Contracts, Mr. Charles F. Doyle, K.C., £250; *Professorship of Civil Engineering, Mr. Pierce F. Purcell, M.A., M.A.I., £600; *Professorship of the National Economics of Ireland, Mr. Thomas M. Kettle, B.A., M.P., £500; *Professorship of Political Economy, Rev. T. A. Finlay, S.J., M.A., £500; Professorship of Architecture,

Sir Thomas Drew, LL.D., £200; Professorship of Commerce, Mr. Charles H. Oldham, B.A., £400; *Lectureship in German, Mrs. M. M. Macken, M.A., £300; Lectureship in Accountancy, —, £150; Lectureship in Banking and Finance, —, £100; *Lectureship in Physics, Mr. J. J. Dowling, M.A., £300; *Lectureship in Botany, Mr. J. Bayley Butler, M.A., £350; Lectureship in Modern Irish History, Miss Mary Hayden, M.A., £250; Lectureship in Ophthalmology, Mr. L. Werner, M.B., £50; *Lectureship in Pure Mathematics, Rev. M. F. Egan, S.J., M.A., £300; Lectureship in Dental Mechanics, Mr. J. L. Potter, L.D.S., £50; Lectureship in Dental Surgery, Mr. E. Sheridan, F.R.C.S., L.D.S., £50; *Lectureship in the Italian and Spanish Languages and Literatures, Miss M. Degani, £300; Lectureship in Eastern Languages, Rev. P. Boylan, M.A., £200; Lectureship in Special Pathology, Mr. M. W. Crofton, M.D., £250; Lectureship in Irish Language, —, £150; Lectureship in Welsh, Mr. J. Lloyd Jones, M.A., £150; Registrarship (this office must be filled by a Professor or Lecturer of the College), Mr. Arthur W. Conway, M.A., D.Sc., £100; *Secretaryship and Bursarship, Mr. J. W. Bacon, M.A., £300 rising by annual increments of £20 to £400, with residence, fuel, and light; *Librarianship, Mr. D. J. O'Donoghue, £200.

University College, Cork.

Professorship of Archæology, Mr. B. C. A. Windle, M.A., D.Sc., M.D., F.R.S., £100; *Professorship of English, Mr. W. F. P. Stockley, M.A., £450; *Professorship of Greek, Mr. C. H. Keene, M.A., £450; *Professorship of History, Mr. P. J. Merriman, M.A., £450; *Professorship of Irish Language and Literature, Rev. Richard Henebry, Ph.D., £450; *Professorship of Latin, Mr. J. P. Molohan, M. A., £500; *Professorship of Mathematics, Mr. A. H. Anglin, M. A., £500; *Professorship of Philosophy, Mr. G. J. Stokes, M.A., £450; *Professorship of Romance Languages, Mr. W. F. T. Butler, M.A., £450; *Professorship of Botany and Agriculture, Major H. Cummins, M.D., £350; *Professorship of Chemistry, Mr. A. E.

Dixon, M.D., £600; *Professorship of Geology and Geography, Mr. Isaac Swain, B.A., £350; *Professorship of Physics, Mr. W. Bergin, M.A., £600; *Professorship of Zoology, Mr. M. Hartog, D.Sc., £550; Professorship of Jurisprudence, —, £150; Professorship of Law, —, £150; *Professorship of Anatomy, Mr. D. P. Fitzgerald, M. B., £600; Professorship of Medicine, Mr. W. E. Ashley Cummins, M.D., £200; Professorship of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Mr. H. Corby, M.D., £200; *Professorship of Pathology, Mr. A. E. Moore, M.B., £500; *Professorship of Physiology, Mr. D. T. Barry, M.D., £600; Professorship of Surgery, Mr. C. Yelverton Pearson, M.D., £250; Professorship of Therapeutics, Mr. J. Dundon, M.D., £100; *Professorship of Civil Engineering, Mr. C. W. O'D. L. Alexander, £600; *Professorship of Economics and Commerce, Mr. Timothy Smiddy, M.A., £450; Lectureship in German, Miss Mary Ryan, M.A., £150; Lectureship in History of Education, Mr. Eugene P. Mac Sweeney, £50; *Lectureship in Methods of Education, Miss Elizabeth M. O'Sullivan, £150; Lectureship in Modern Irish, Mr. Eamon O'Donoghoe, £150; Lectureship in Music, Mr. F. St. J. Lacy, A.R.A.M., £50; Lectureship in Philosophy, Rev. Edwin F. Fitzgibbon, O.S. F.C., B.A., Ph.D., £150; *Lectureship in Mathematical Physics, Mr. Matthew Conran, M.A., £250; Lectureship in Hygiene, Mr. D. D. Donovan, L.R.C.S., £50; Lectureship in Materia Medica, Mr. J. Dundon, M.D., £50; Lectureship in Medical Jurisprudence, Mr. P. T. O'Sullivan, M. D., £50; Lectureship in Mental Diseases, Mr. J. J. Fitzgerald, M. B., £50; Lectureship in Ophthalmology, Mr. A. W. Sandford, M.D., £50; Lectureship in Architecture, Mr. A. Hill, B.E., £50; Lectureship in Electrical Technology, Mr. P. E. Belas, B.A., £50; Lectureship in Accounting, Mr. A. J. Magennis, A.S.A.A., £50; Registrarship (this office must be filled by a Professor or Lecturer of the College), Mr. W. F. T. Butler, M.A., £100, with residence, fuel, and light; *Secretaryship and Bursarship, Mr. Henry Clifton, M.A., £200, rising by annual increments of £10 to £250; *Librarianship, Mr. J. Fawcett, £200.

University College, Galway.

*Professorship of Modern Irish Language and Literature, Mr. Thomas O'Maille, M.A., Ph.D., £300; Professorship of Celtic Philology, —, £150; *Professorship of Greek, Mr. R. K. M'Elderry, £350; *Professorship of Latin, Mr. C. Exon, £350; *Professorship of Mathematics, Mr. W. A. Houston, £350; *Professorship of Physics, Mr. Alexander Anderson, M.A., LL.D., £350; *Professorship of History, English Literature, and Mental Science, Mr. W. F. Trench, M.A., £350; *Professorship of Chemistry, Mr. A. Senier, Ph.D., £350; *Professorship of Natural History, Geology, and Mineralogy, Mr. R. J. Anderson, £350; *Professorship of Civil Engineering, Mr. E. Townsend, M.A., D.Sc., £350; *Professorship of Modern Languages, Mr. V. Steinberger, M.A., £350; *Professorship of Anatomy and Physiology, Mr. J. P. Pye, M.D., £350; Professorship of Jurisprudence and Political Economy, —, £150; Professorship of English Law, Mr. J. M. Sweetman, £150; Professorship of Medicine, Mr. J. I. Lynham, M.D., £150; Professorship of Surgery, Mr. W. W. Brereton, £150; Professorship of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Mr. R. J. Kinkead, B.A., M.D., £150; Professorships of Materia Medica and Pharmacy, Mr. N. W. Colohan, M.D., M.Ch., £150; Lectureship in Electrical Engineering, Mr. J. Griffiths, B.Sc., £120; Lectureships in Medical Jurisprudence and Hygiene, Mr. R. J. Kinkead, B.A., M.D., and Mr. A. Senier, Ph.D., £20 each; Lectureship in Fever Cases, Mr. N. W. Colohan, M.D., M.Ch., £20; Registrarship (the Registrar, the Bursar, and the Librarian must be selected from the Professors and Lecturers of the College), Mr. E. Townsend, M.A., D.Sc., £75, with residence, fuel, and light; Bursarship, Mr. J. I. Lynham, M.D., £75; Librarianship, Mr. V. Steinberger, M.A., £75.

Those offices marked thus * are full-time appointments; the others are not. Offices with no name attached are, so far as

I am aware, not yet filled. It should be remembered that in University College, Galway, the Professors and Lecturers who held office on the 30th of September, 1908, are entitled to Class Fees as well as Salaries.

To arrive roughly at the equivalent of any of these salaries in American dollars the amount may be multiplied by 5: to arrive at the true value this product should be multiplied again by 2, in order to equalize the ratio between a country like Ireland, where commodities are comparatively cheap in terms of money, and a country like the United States, where money is admittedly cheap in terms of commodities. In fixing the ratio I am guided by my experience in Dublin and Washington. Thus the true American value of President Coffey's position is $1,800 \times 5 \times 2 = 18,000$ dollars per annum.

CONCLUSION.

There are a thousand and one other points on which, *spatiis exclusus iniquis*, I have been unable to touch. Enough, however, has perhaps been said to illustrate the difficulties that lay before the framers of the Act and the Charters and their courage and skill in overcoming them. It is obvious also that a herculean task confronted the Commissioners in the drawing up of the Statutes. As one sees how carefully they provided for every contingency, one is lost in admiration of their forethought, their ability, and their broad-mindedness. It will not be their fault if the University is not a splendid success.

The salient points that struck me, as I read through the various bulky documents which I had to study, were that the new academic scheme in Ireland is frankly, openly, and undisguisedly co-educational; that the University and the Colleges will be from the start largely under lay control, and will probably be increasingly so; that the studies will be entirely secular, unless by private enterprise religious teaching is brought in; that a distinct novelty is introduced in giving to popular representative bodies like city, urban, and county councils a

voice in the government of the Constituent Colleges; that another novelty is that of adopting the system so well known in America of giving credit for studies pursued, terms kept, and examinations passed in other Universities; that the machinery provided for the management of the University and its dependent but autonomous colleges, though cumbersome, is by no means chaotic; that while the olden *litterae humaniores* are to be splendidly taught, special stress is to be laid, in accordance with modern needs and ideas, on practical scientific and commercial studies; that research work, for which there were but few opportunities in the Royal University, is to be a distinguishing feature of its successor; that the excellence and high standard of Irish University degrees is to be maintained; that Professors, Lecturers, and other officials, as well as being reasonably paid, are given, under conditions that are not onerous, undoubted security of tenure in their positions; and that every precaution is taken for safe, sane, and pure administration.

Among the difficulties which I foresee will be that of standardizing the teaching as between the University and the different Constituent Colleges, between the Constituent Colleges *inter se*, and between them and the Recognized Colleges. This was obviously in the mind of the Commissioners when they inserted a special chapter in the University Statute on the subject. It is, however, a difficulty which with due care and attention may be overcome.

There is also the question of the insufficiency of endowment, to which reference has been already made.⁹ That the matter is a serious one has been abundantly shown. It would be a pity—nay, it would be nothing short of a scandal—if Parliament did not at the outset, by a further grant of public funds, place the University and all its Constituent Colleges on such a financial basis as to allow them to exercise the widest powers for the improvement of education in Ireland. To do so will be only a small instalment towards the righting of many Irish educational wrongs.

⁹ See *Catholic University Bulletin*, February, 1910, pp. 102-106.

As a final word I may be permitted to say, that, looking at the subject in a broad and comprehensive way, I am filled with hope for the effect likely to be produced on the Ireland of the future by the establishment of this twentieth-century University.

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NOTES ON EDUCATION.

RELIGIOUS READERS.—*Continued.*

However useful text-books may be, whether in the form of religious readers or of catechisms, the Catholic Church has always insisted that faith comes by hearing. No text-book can ever take the place of oral instruction in the teaching of religion. If this be true of the adult, it is preëminently true of the child. Nevertheless, the text-book has its legitimate function to perform and it should be so constructed as to perform this function efficiently and its method should harmonize with that employed in the oral instruction which should precede and accompany it in every stage of the child's development. But this does not mean that the oral instruction is identical in matter and form with that contained in the text-book. On the contrary, one should be the complement of the other. The oral instruction of young children must of necessity proceed by means of question and answer, but this by no means justifies the conclusion that the text-book on religion should take on the form of question and answer.

Dr. Scannell, in an able article on Christian Doctrine in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, says: "Oral instruction by means of question and answer has occupied a prominent place in the scholastic method of moral and religious teachers of all countries and of all ages. The Socratic dialogues will occur to everyone as brilliant examples. But many centuries before Socrates' day this method was practiced among the Hebrews. . . . Proselytes were carefully instructed before being admitted to become members of the Jewish faith. The regular instruction of children began when they were twelve years old. Thus we read of Christ 'in the temple, sitting in the midst of the doctors, hearing them, and asking them questions. And all that heard Him were astonished at His wisdom and His

answers.' During His public life He frequently made use of the catechetical method to impart instruction: 'What think ye of Christ? Whose Son is He?' 'Whom do men say that the son of man is? . . . Whom do ye say that I am?', etc."

It should be observed that the catechetical method here alluded to is diametrically opposed to that employed in our modern catechisms. Our Saviour's questions were more like those of Socrates; they were calculated to call forth the thought and belief of His disciples in their own words. His was a method of drawing out and developing the content of the disciple's mind. Socrates never dictated the answer to one of his own questions. He asked the questions; His disciples answered them. The same is true of Christ. He asks His disciples questions to compel them to see the inevitable conclusion of a premise, the strict fulfilment of a prophecy, or the practical application of some doctrine that He taught. When, instead of this, we formulate the answer to our own question and compel the child to memorize it, we are giving him the letter of the law, which killeth, instead of the spirit which giveth life. The rabbinical school followed this method and the deplorable consequences to which it led are well known.

If questions are employed in the text-book for a young child, they should be of such a character as to help the child to master the thought contained in an uninterrupted story. In most cases, however, it is preferable that the catechist should ask the questions in his own way. He can thus follow up the thought of the child and secure better results than may be attained by any set of rigid questions printed in the text-book. Dr. Scannell, on a later page of the article from which we have just quoted, says: "A good catechism should conform strictly to the definition given above. That is to say, it should be elementary, not a learned treatise of dogmatic, moral, and ascetical theology; and it should be simple in language, avoiding technical expressions as far as consistent with accuracy." Thus far there will be few to quarrel with Dr. Scannell's statement, but he continues: "Should the form of question and answer be maintained? No doubt it is not an interesting form for grown-

up persons; but the children prefer it because it lets them know exactly what they are likely to be asked. Moreover, this form keeps up the idea of a teacher and a disciple, and so is most in conformity with the fundamental notion of catechizing."

Obviously, Dr. Scannell here confuses the function of the text-book with that of the teacher. The text-book should furnish the information which will enable the pupil to answer the teacher's questions, but it should not usurp the place of the teacher. Moreover, there will be many who will totally disagree with his statement that the children prefer the question and answer form. The children love above all things a connected, simple story, and it is only out of this form that they are enabled to derive clear concepts of the matter in hand. The question and answer form appeals only to children who rely exclusively on memory and shirk the burden of thinking, or to those children who are afraid of their teacher and who, in consequence, do not dare to reveal their own thoughts lest they should be held up to ridicule.

There is another statement in this article that runs counter to the best catechetical methods of the past and of the present. "In some countries religious instruction forms part of the daily curriculum, and is mainly given on week days by trained teachers. Where this is the case it is not difficult to secure that the children shall learn by heart some official text-book. With this as a foundation the priest (who will by no means restrict his labors to Sunday work) will be able to explain and illustrate and enforce what they have learned by heart. The teachers' business will be chiefly to put the catechism into the child's head; the priest must get in into his heart." This is an inversion of the natural order. It is a method that runs counter to the fundamental laws of mental development. To memorize what is not understood is at all times a difficult task, because the truth thus memorized is not assimilated and must be held in the mind as a foreign element. But the child's difficulty is not the worst feature of this method. Erroneous notions attach themselves to what is not understood and prevent a subsequent understanding of the matter. We have dealt with

this subject extensively in earlier articles. Archbishop Messmer denounces this method in unsparing terms in his work on Spirago's method, which we quoted in the last number of the *Bulletin*.

Apart from the points which have been here referred to, Dr. Scannell's article is an admirable presentation of the whole subject and it is calculated to render great assistance to the army of devoted men and women who are engaged in the work of teaching catechism in our parochial schools and Sunday Schools throughout the English speaking world.

Many attempts have been made in recent years to bring the methods of teaching religion into harmony with the laws of genetic psychology. This is particularly the case throughout Germany. It is worthy of note, however, that this movement has at the same time served to bring the present method of teaching catechism into conformity with the best catechetical traditions in the Catholic Church. However the proposed systems differ in details there is practical agreement in fundamentals. The Herbart-Ziller system, so strongly endorsed by the editor of the *Katechetische Blätter*, insists that the matter be so arranged that the topics be presented together which are essentially one. In this way, each item of knowledge that is mastered should prove an effective help to the child in the acquisition of each subsequent item. The process should be in concentric circles. A second fundamental characteristic of this method is its insistence upon the three formal steps: Presentation, Explanation, and Application. There is added to this, but as a less important feature, a short Preparation before the Presentation together with Combination, that is, a gathering together of the threads of thought after Explanation.

In the Munich School the *instruction never begins with the catechetical questions*. The aim is to capture the child's interest at the very beginning and to hold his attention throughout. In this method the instruction always begins with a story from life or from the Bible, with a catechetical, Biblical, or historical picture, with a point of liturgy, Church History, the lives of the saints, or some such objective lesson. The catechist

then proceeds to evolve from the lesson the concepts which he is intent on developing, after which he proceeds to combine these concepts into the doctrine of the catechism and to make the formal applications of the truth to the life of the child.

The material for the presentation may be taken at random, but evidently there would be a large gain for the child and for the teacher if the material suitable for this exercise were culled from the Bible and Church History and nature and woven together into organic unity in the reader which we place in the children's hands. This seems to be demanded by the psychology of the situation and it would also serve to bring our method into closer agreement with that employed by Christ Himself and by the Fathers of the Church.

St. Augustine, in his *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, recommends the practice of beginning the instruction of converts with a connected narrative of the chief events in the history of God's dealings with man. This should embrace the Old and New Testaments and the History of the Church brought up to date, however meagre the outline. From this, according to him, we should proceed to evolve the fundamental doctrines of Christianity.

Our Lord counted on the main facts of the Scriptures and the prophecies being familiar to His hearers and His discourses were made up largely of the second exercise, that is, evolving the doctrinal and moral lessons from the Scriptures and from the simple natural phenomena familiar to His hearers. He constantly referred to the Prophets or to some type or figure in the Old Testament and pointed to its fulfilment in His own life. Or, calling attention to some natural phenomenon, He illustrated a spiritual truth which He would impress upon His hearers.

Catechists of every school will agree with Dr. Scannell when he says, under the head of Practical Catechetics, in his article in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*: "The teacher should endeavor to influence the child's heart and will and not be content with putting a certain amount of religious knowledge into its head; for, as Aristotle would say, the end of catechizing is not knowl-

edge, but practice. Knowledge, indeed, there must be, and the more of it the better in this age of widespread secular education; but the knowledge must lead to action."

It is evident from all that has been said that, in the first two grades of the primary school, at least, the matter and method required for the best religious instruction are at the same time eminently suitable for the child's reader. Moreover, combining the work of reading with that of religious instruction not only saves time for the child, but ministers to the most urgent need of his unfolding life, that is, unity. We do not agree with the spirit of Dr. Scannell's remark that in teaching religion "both teacher and child must realize that they are engaged in a religious work, and not in one of the ordinary lessons of the day." Everything that the child learns at this stage of his development should be reduced to practice as soon as possible, for it is only in the practical application of the truth that it is rendered fecund in the child's mind. He should, therefore, be led to realize from the very beginning that whatever he does, whether he eats, or drinks, or plays, or sleeps, his action should be animated by a religious spirit. To separate out religion as a thing apart, to take its place side by side with the other branches, is the root of the very evils of which Dr. Scannell complains. It is this procedure that is responsible, in large measure, for the Catholic so often met with in our day who will go to Mass on Sunday and when he reaches his office Monday morning is careful to forget all about the Sunday sermon. In fact, the thought of blending religion with business seems to him grotesque, and whatever his public protestations may be, he proceeds to act on the maxim that "business is business."

The chief problem before us, then, in the development of a suitable Catholic reader, is to select the right material and to organize it in the right way. The connected historical narrative recommended by St. Augustine is unquestionably the right procedure when dealing with adults, and probably when dealing with the older children, but the child has little need of historical sequence and he is wholly unable to handle so large

an array of materials in one uninterrupted narrative. Separate instances and short biographical sketches must be taken from this record and woven into the child's experience. In this way only can he assimilate the truths and grow to a mental and moral stature that will enable him to follow a strict historical development.

If we cannot fall back on the historical sequence of events in the story of Christianity, upon what shall we rely in the selection of our material? Evidently, in this the little child must lead us. What materials does he need in the upbuilding of his mental structures, and what moral lessons is he prepared for? When this is clear, it should not be difficult for us to select the materials for Presentation.

Dr. Henseling of Leipzig contributes a very valuable study on this subject in a recent number of the *Zeitschrift für pädagogische Psychologie*,¹ under the title "Erfahrungen über die Stellung der Schulkinder zur religiösen Tradition," from which we quote the following account of a lesson given by the author to children in the third grade to whom he had told the story of our Lord's life with more or less detail. The lesson is divided into two parts. In the first the children are asked to imagine the presence in their midst of one who had never heard of Our Lord. Then each child was required to state what story about our Lord he would tell to the stranger and to give the reasons for his choice of story in the fewest words possible. This lesson is calculated to develop the logical consequences of the events narrated from the life of Our Saviour, but the lesson had better be given in the words of Dr. Henseling, or, rather, in the simple statements of the children gathered around him to whom he yields the rostrum for the moment.²

¹ 11. Jahrgang, Heft 1. s. 42.

² Many men as yet know nothing of the Lord Jesus. Imagine that such a man were here with us! Each one of you shall tell him a story!--Now, let each one of you tell me which story he would relate under those circumstances: Why, precisely, that story!--Hans R.: "How Jesus was born--since one cannot begin in the middle of things." Heinrich B.: "Jesus in the temple -- --." Walter H.: "The Wise Men from the East--that is the next story." Wilhelm B.: "How Jesus healed the man with the palsy." Gerhard W.: "I will tell him

“Viele Menschen wissen noch nichts von dem Herrn Jesus. Denkt, ein solcher Mensch Wäre jetzt hier! Jeder soll ihm eine Geschichte erzählen!—Nun soll mir jeder sagen, welche Geschichte er da erzählen will und: warum grad die!—Hans R.: ‘Wie Jesus geboren wurde—man kann doch nicht so aus der Mitte heraus anfangen.’ Heinrich B.: ‘Jesus im Tempel—’ Walter H.: ‘Die Weisen aus dem Morgenlande—das ist die nächste Geschichte.’ Wilhelm B.: ‘Wie Jesus den Gichtbrüchigen heilt.’ Gerhard W.: ‘Ich will ihm erzählen: Wie Jesus den Sturm stilt—damit er weiss, dass Herr Jesus was kann.’ Ernst P.: ‘Der reiche Fischzug—damit er weiss, dass der Herr Jesus mehr kann als andere Menschen.’ Heinrich B.: ‘Ich Möchte gern erzählen von Jesus Kreuzigung—weil er so viel ausgehalten hat; was sie alles mit ihm gemacht haben!’ Herbert S.: ‘Die Hochzeit zu Kana—weil er aus dem Wasser Wein gemacht hat.’ (Vergnügtes Lächeln bei vielen!) Herbert F.: ‘Die Hochzeit zu Kana—weil er das erste Wunder getan hat.’ Paul F.: ‘Jesus stilt den Sturm—weil das Wunder niemand tun kann.’ Walter F.: ‘Wie Herr Jesus auf dem Wasser gelaufen ist—weil, das können nicht so viele Leute, das kann

how Jesus stilled the storm.—From this he will understand that Jesus has power.” Ernst P.: “The draft of fishes.—From this he will understand that the Lord Jesus can do more than other men.” Heinrich B.: “I would like to tell about the crucifixion of Jesus—because He suffered so much; all that they did to Him.” Herbert S.: “The wedding feast of Cana.—Because He made wine out of water.” (Amused giggling on the part of many of the children.) Herbert F.: “The wedding feast at Cana.—Because He worked His first miracle.” Paul F.: “Jesus stilled the storm.—Because no one can work this miracle.” Walter F.: “How Jesus ran on the water.—Because so many people cannot do this; only the Lord Jesus can do this.” Hermann Th.: “Where Jesus was before the judge.—Because He then knew that the Pharisees hated Him.” Erhard D.: “How Jesus was crucified.—Because the man did not know that Jesus had lived.” And then: “Where Jesus healed the ear of the servant.—Because no body could do this.” Hans R.: “But if we tell the man the story he will not believe a bit of it.”—Yes, many a one has said that when the story of the Lord Jesus was told to him, but many others have wished to hear more about the Lord Jesus; and then they have taken the Book and have read the entire story, and many have then said: I also will be a Christian. And while the Lord Jesus still lived the people told many wonderful stories about Him. And there also came many and asked the Lord: “Lord, give us a sign that we may believe in thee.” Jesus sent them home and neither did He work a miracle for King Herod. What He appreciated was a pure heart.

doch bloss der Herr Jesus.' Hermann Th.: 'Wo Jesus vor Gericht war—weil er dann weiss, dass die Pharisäer Rache an ihm hatten.' Erhard D.: 'Wo Jesus gekreuzigt wird—weil der Mann doch nicht weiss, dass Jesus schon gelebt hatte.' Und dann: 'Wo Jesus dem einen Knecht das Ohr wieder heilt—weil das niemand kann.' Hans R.: 'Aber wenn wir nun dem Mann die Geschichte erzählen, da glaubt er's doch gar nicht!—Ja, das hat auch schon mancher gesagt, als ihm von dem Herrn Jesus erzählt wurde. Viele andere aber wollten noch mehr von dem Herrn Jesus hören: und dann haben sie das Buch genommen und haben alle die Geschichten gelesen, und viele haben dann gesagt: Ich will auch ein Christ werden! Und als der Herr Jesus noch lebte, da erzählten die Leute schon viele wunderbare Geschichten von ihm. Da kamen auch manche und baten den Herrn: 'Herr tue uns ein Zeichen, so wollen wir an dich glauben!' Jesus hat sie heimgeschickt und auch dem König Herodes hat er kein Wunder vorgemacht. Ihm kommt's auf andere Dinge an: ein reines Herz.—"

The imitative instinct is very strong in children and the Doctor here acted very wisely in appealing to it. The precocious child in the group alone felt the difficulty that there would be in the stranger's way in believing the stories of the miracles and events in Jesus' life. This is not a child's attitude; it seldom crops out before the eighth or ninth year and frequently not until several years later. But there is usually one or another of this type of child to be found in every class where the children are more than eight years old, and his doubts, like those of St. Thomas, the apostle, if wisely handled, may be made to strengthen the faith of the others and to prepare them against the day of trial. The appeal is here made to Church History, and it is one of the main uses that should be made of the facts of Church History when dealing with classes of young children, and, indeed, this argument never loses its cogency. The cloud of witnesses will always strengthen the faith of the weak. It is easy to believe what multitudes of others have believed. It is when we imagine ourselves alone in our beliefs that the strength of our faith is

tested. But, we have broken into the midst of Dr. Henseling's lesson. After his comment, he turned immediately to the children and helped them to make the practical Application.³

"Und nun denkt einmal, der Herr Jesus käme zu uns ins Zimmer und sagte: Nun soll mir jeder von euch eine Bitte sagen! Um was würdet ihr denn bitten?—Heinrich B.: 'Ich täte sagen: Lass mich fromm werden, dass ich ein reines Herz bekomme!' Walter L.: 'Gesundheit.' Herbert S.: 'Ein Pferd.' Hermann Th.: 'Wenn ich, dass hier jetzt ein recht grosser Haufen Gold läge.' Erhard D.: 'Langes Leben.' Ernst P.: 'Gesundheit!' Gerhard H.: 'Dass ich in Himmel komme.' Walter H.: 'Kann sich noch nicht entschliessen.' Hans P.: 'Dass ich in Himmel komme; und Recht langes Leben.' Herbert Z.: 'Dass ich in Himmel komme.' Herbert F.: 'Recht langes Leben.' Paul G.: 'Das ich nicht alt werde—nu ja, das is doch nischt.' Gerhard W.: 'Ich möchte fromm werden; frommes Herz!' Hans R.: 'Dass ich in den Himmel komme.' Herbert K.: 'Dass ich fleissig werde und viel lerne.' Walter F.: 'Dass ich lauter Taschen voll Mark-

³And now imagine that the Lord Jesus came to us, here in this room, and said : Now, let each one of you make one request of me! For what would you ask Him? Heinrich B. : "I would say, let me become pious that I may obtain a pure heart." Walter L. : "Health." Herbert S. : "A horse." Hermann Th. : "That I might have here just now a great big pile of gold." Erhard D. : "Long life." Ernst P. : "Health." Gerhard H. : "That I may go to Heaven." Walter H. : Cannot yet make up his mind. Hans P. : "That I may go to Heaven, and have a very long life." Herbert Z. : "That I may go to Heaven." Herbert F. : "A very long life." Paul G. : "That I may not grow old—Well, yes, that is nothing." Gerhard W. : "I wish to become pious; a devout heart." Hans R. : "That I may go to Heaven." Herbert K. : "That I may become diligent and learn a great deal." Walter F. : "That I may have my pockets full of money." Wilhelm B. : "That I may go to Heaven." Otto Sch. : "Long life." Hermann Th. : "That there might be a kinematograph here, just now."—I now divided the wishes into three groups: 1. Devout hearts, going to Heaven, to become diligent and to learn much. 2. Health, and long life. 3. A horse, much money, a kinematograph.—Do you think that all these requests would please the Lord Jesus? Whereupon many : "No, not the last!" And which would give him the most pleasure? "The first." And what would He say to those who asked Him for a devout heart, to go to Heaven, and for diligence and wisdom? Hermann S. : "You must do most of this for yourselves."

schtuckchen habbe.' Wilhelm B.: 'Dass ich in den Himmel komme.' Otto Sch.: 'Langes Leben.' Hermann Th.: 'Und dass jetzt hier gleich ein Kinematographen ist.'—Ich schied nun die Wünsche in drei Gruppen: 1. Frommes Herz, Himmelreich, fleissig werden und viel lernen. 2. Gesundheit und langes Leben. 3. Ein Pferd, viel Geld, Kinematographen.—Meint ihr, dass dem Herrn Jesus alle diese Bitten Freude machen? Darauf viele: 'Nein, die letzten nicht!' Und welche werden ihn wohl am meisten freuen? Die ersten. Und was wird er wohl denen sagen, die um ein frommes Herz, um das Himmelreich, um Fleiss und Klugheit bitten? Hermann S.: 'Da Müsst ihr selbst am meisten sorgen!'"

The ethical lesson here has a value incalculably greater than any formal statement that might be given to the children to commit to memory. Their ethical judgment is developed and their critical sense awakened. In looking at their own conduct from the standpoint of Jesus, they spontaneously take His point of view in judging of the value of things desirable. The desire for earthly possessions was quite natural and found its expression on the lips of several of the children, but when they were brought to look at the matter, not from the standpoint of their own cupidity, but from that of their Heavenly Guide, they soon recognized the things that have value in His eyes and the things that they should pray for. The final judgment called forth from Hermann S. concerning the advice that Jesus would give to those who asked for virtue instead of earthly possessions is very mature for a child in the third grade and probably resulted from previous training or from conversations overheard in his home. Nevertheless its expression here could not fail to be helpful to all the other children; it would help them to form their own judgments along similar lines more than if the judgment came directly from the teacher.

The lesson was given to children in the third grade, presumably to children somewhat more than eight years old, for the Doctor remarks in an earlier paragraph that this phase of development is scarcely begun in children six or seven years of age. It is hardly necessary to add that the Explanation and

Application must be adjusted to the stage of development through which the children are passing if good results are to be attained. Children in a slightly earlier phase of development would be quite incapable of following the lesson given above. The Doctor brings out this contrast very well in a paragraph immediately following the one which we have just quoted.⁴

“Wie oben, fragte ich auch einmal im 2. Schuljahr: Welche Geschichte würdt ihr erzählen? Josef K.: ‘Die Speisung des 5000 Mannes—da gefällt mir, dass der Herr Jesus den Menschen Brot gegeben hat.’ Hellmut G.: ‘Wo er betete im Garten Gethsemane—mir gefällt, weil er gebetet hat.’ Herbert K.: ‘Wie die Weisen aus dem Morgenlande kamen—mir gefällt, dass die Weisen den Herrn Jesus beschenkt haben.’ Harry Z.: ‘Der barmherzige Samariter—weil der den Kranken aufgehoben hat.’ Kurt W.: ‘Von dem Jüngling, wie der geweckt worden ist—mir gefällt, dass er ihn wieder aufgeweckt hat, den Jüngling, Herr Jesus.’ Georg B.: “Von den Weisen aus dem Morgenlande—weil der liebe Gott das kleine Kind schützt hat.’ Fritz B.: ‘Wie die Wiesen aus dem Morgenlande kamen—wie die Weisen nicht mehr zum Herodes gegangen sind.’ Hans. St.: ‘Wo Herr Jesus über das Meer gegangen war—dass der Herr Jesus über dem Wasser gegangen war; und wo der andere auch wollte gehen auf dem Wasser, aber er brach ein.’ Dazu Josef K.: ‘Da hat mir was andres besser gefallen,

⁴ Under similar circumstances I once asked the question in the second grade: Which story would you tell? Josef K.: “The feeding of the five thousand men.—I like it because the Lord Jesus gave bread to the men.” Hellmut G.: “Where he prayed in the Garden of Gethsemane.—I like it because he prayed.” Herbert K.: “How the Wise Men came from the East.—I like it because the Wise Men brought presents to Jesus.” Harry Z.: “The Good Samaritan.—Because he cared for the sick man.” Kurt W.: “About the young man, how he was brought to life.—I like that He, the Lord Jesus, brought him, the young man, back to life.” George B.: “About the Wise Men from the East.—Because the Good God protected the Little Child.” Fritz B.: “How the Wise Men came from the East.—How the Wise Men did not go back again to Herod.” Hans St.: “Where the Lord Jesus passed over the sea—that the Lord Jesus walked on the water; and how the other wished to walk on the water, but broke in.” Whereupon Joseph K.: “There is something else that pleases me better; something very fine: I like how he saved Peter.”

was ganz Feines: Da hat mir gefallen, wo er den Petrus gerettet hatte.' ”

It would be hard to find a better illustration of the transition which usually takes place in children somewhere about the completion of the seventh year, than is to be seen in the contrast between these two sets of children. The children in the second grade, as shown in this lesson, have scarcely any perception of the value of the incidents in Our Lord's life as proofs of His extraordinary character. They would exhibit Him to the stranger as a good man who does the things that they were taught should be done by good people. He fed the hungry. There is no consciousness of a miracle. He prays in the Garden, etc. Or they are attracted by the interest of the story itself, as in the case of the journey of the Wise Men, or the walking on the water, or of Jesus rescuing Peter. There is no miracle for the child at this age. The most impossible happenings are ordinary events to him and are taken as a matter of course.

Clearly, therefore, in the Explanation and the Application we must wait for the proper stage in the child's development before attempting to evolve fundamental principles and ethical concepts. The material for presentation in the first two grades should be selected with this limitation of the children in view. Nature stories, domestic scenes, and stories from the New Testament may be used with great effect in these grades if we keep the child's needs in view. An examination of the books which we have prepared for the children in the first and second grades, under the title *Religion, First and Second Book*, respectively, will, we believe, reveal how this may be accomplished. In *Religion, Third Book*, now in preparation, the later phase of the child's development is taken into account and materials from the Old and New Testaments and the History of the Church are used so as to develop doctrinal concepts.

Before taking up a more detailed analysis of these books, however, it will be well to examine briefly some of the series of readers in current use in our schools with a view to ascertaining their fitness for supplying the requisite material for the

children's religious instruction in the grades for which they are designed.

Among the readers which have been issued for use in our Catholic schools during the last ten or twelve years the following are the best known: The Columbus series published by Schwartz, Kirwin and Fauss in 1897, the McBride Art Readers, published in 1898, the New Century Catholic Series published by Benziger Brothers in 1903, the American Normal Readers, published by Silver, Burdette and Company in 1907, and the Standard Catholic Readers published by the American Book Company in 1909.

It would seem that these books were in every case primarily designed as readers and with their qualifications as such we have dealt to some extent in the preceding installments of this discussion. In speaking of the availability of a book, as containing the material for presentation in the child's religious education, however, we cannot lose sight of its quality as a reader, for if it fails here it cannot be admitted to our schools at all, since the problem before us is how to use an *available reader* as a basis for religious instruction.

In examining the Columbus series of readers with this two-fold end in view, we find the first two books of the series decidedly unsatisfactory on both counts. As a reader, the child's first book should develop a vocabulary of six or eight hundred words. The first reader of this series uses only two hundred and twenty-one words and the first and second readers together have a vocabulary of only seven hundred and thirty-four words, just about one-third of the vocabulary which we have a right to demand of the first two years in school. The books are, therefore, insufficient as readers and our examination need not proceed further. But books that are in fact in the hands of many of our children deserve a more thorough study.

The Columbus First Reader is a dreary word drill; there is little or no interesting content from end to end of the book. It would seem as if the author wished to show in how many ways he could combine a few words. The pictures in the book

are atrocious; the distorted animals, the stiff and lifeless children, the glaring color daubs of this book, are enough to destroy the very roots of the children's artistic sense. Pictures are an essential feature of elementary readers. They should be simple, of course, but above all things they must be in good taste and they should be true to life. They should tell the story that is contained in the printed text. This is particularly true of the First Book. The content of the Columbus First Reader is entirely valueless; it is a series of fragments for the most part as dull and lifeless as the pictures. These fragments deal chiefly with cats and rats and dogs and cows. They neither help to develop the home life of the child nor to create a sympathy with nature.

When examined from a religious point of view, it is hard to see what peculiar claim this First Reader has to be called Catholic. There is not a trace of any religious concept to be found in the book until we reach Lesson 95. Here God is introduced abruptly; there is no preparation whatever for the thought. God is mentioned for the first time in a sketch of a bad boy robbing a bird's nest. The boy thinks no one sees him, and argues the point out with his companion who insists that God sees him. The idea of God as the Creator of the flowers is introduced somewhat more happily in Lesson 98. Finally, in the closing lesson, the children are warned to be good because God is with them and sees them. The religious content is, in fact, more meagre than the meagre vocabulary, and perhaps it is just as well; there are few who would wish to have the thoughts about God and the beautiful truths of religion associated in the child's mind with dreary word drills and lifeless context.

In the Second Reader the story content appears in a somewhat improved form, but the drill is still too obvious to permit of the child's enjoyment. What has been said of the pictures in the first book applies here with equal force. The religious element, however, is a much more conspicuous feature than in the first book. The Sixth Lesson is on God's Love. The theme is attractive. Let us see how it is presented.

GOD'S LOVE

Mama, it is time to go to bed now. Will you tell me what to say when I pray? Yes, you must thank God for being so kind to you, and thank Him for His love. Mama, does God love everyone? No, God does not love bad boys and bad girls. What must I do, Mama, to make God love me? You must be kind and good. You must give thanks to Him when you pray. You must not say bad words. You must do all the good you can, and do it every day. You must pray not only for those who love you but for all who do not. Think, my boy, of some of the things God does for us. He gives us all we eat and drink. He gives us the warm sunshine, the green grass, and the pretty flowers. He loves us, for He made us. When I pray, Mama, I shall say, "My God, I thank you for your love, and for all the good things you give me. Make me kind and good so that some day I can be with you."

Is there any need of comment on this lesson? The thought is religious enough, but was there ever anything so unnatural and impossible? This child should die and go to Heaven at once. Think of a little six year old coming to mama with the opening statement in the story, or of his leaving her with the closing sentence. Was there ever a real flesh and blood boy who wouldn't hate the little prig? If the mother instinct should so far desert any real mother as to permit her to preach to her child in this way, salvation is to be looked for only through miracles.

There are several other religious sketches in this book. They make their appearance at stated intervals without paying the slightest attention to what went before or to what is coming after. Many of them vie with "God's Love" from an artistic standpoint, while others are not altogether bad. Lesson 26 ushers in the second religious theme, the Mass. The lesson might well serve as a model of the way in which the theme should not be presented.

THE MASS.

It is Sunday. We must go to Mass. Come, Kitty, get ready for Mass. We must be there in time. We must not be late. We are going to hear Mass. See, all the boys and girls are walking to Mass. They do not play, for it is Sunday, and they are going to hear Mass. Here we are, let us say our prayers. Let us pray for Mama and Papa and offer up the Mass for them. Here is the priest. He says the Mass. We must now think of the Mass. The priest is at the altar. It is the altar of God. We can read the Mass in our prayer books. We can pray to Mary, the Mother of God. Now the Mass is over. The priest has come down from the altar and has said the last prayers. We said the prayers with him. We read the Mass in our prayer books, we prayed to the Mother of God. We go out from Mass with the boys and the girls and go to our houses. We have been to the House of God, and we have prayed to God to make us good boys and girls. We were not late. We were on time. We have been to hear Mass. We have been in God's House. We must be good.

This is designed for a child in his seventh year. There is no preparation whatever for the idea of the Mass and it is hard to see what ideas the children may glean from this lesson, unless, indeed, it be this, that they mustn't play because it is Sunday. And the children are supposed to be Catholics and not Puritans. That they should go to Mass and be there on time are, indeed, two good practical lessons that are here insisted upon. But what meaning is the child to glean from such statements as we must now think of the Mass, we can read the Mass in our prayer books, we can pray to Mary, the Mother of God. It is hard to see how the child can fail to develop erroneous concepts from statements such as these. Of course the child should pray to Mary, the Mother of God, but are we to lead him unawares into the belief that this is practically the same thing as reading the Mass? The whole sketch is a bit of adult theology that has totally failed to take shape in the child's thought.

Several catechism lessons are introduced towards the end of the book, and there is a vivid sketch of a boy accomplishing the almost impossible task of learning his catechism lesson. The psychology of suggestion here is of the worst possible kind. If the lesson were designed for an adult instead of a child, we might have little fault to find with it, as it does express a truth that most of us are only too keenly aware of.

The third book of this series is much better than the two preceding ones, but we are not now concerned with the later phase of development to which it appeals.

We need hardly pause here to criticise the McBride Readers. They have been tried for more than a decade and they have very generally been found wanting. There are many things in the books, however, that deserve commendation. One of their chief faults, it would seem, is a failure to properly grade the material.

We have examined the New Century Readers in another connection and we need only concern ourselves here with the religious element in these books. There are four religious sketches in the first book. The first is of St. Anthony and the Child Jesus. The sketch in itself is not so bad, but the thought suddenly breaks off in the middle of the story and the text continues without any warning about two little birds and their nest, about kitty and a big ball, and the boys hurraing around the flag. We have here the same jumble and confusion of thought to which we alluded in our former reference to this book. Lesson 30 is a brief sketch of the picture of the Child Jesus in the carpenter shop. Lesson 45 is a sweet little story woven round the picture of Christ blessing little children. Finally, Lesson 56 presents the Child Jesus enforcing obedience to the Fourth Commandment. The sketch in itself is good, but again it appears as a foreign element in the book, not coördinated with any of the material with which it is surrounded.

There are five religious sketches in the Second Reader. The first of these is a brief story of St. Elizabeth. It is very doubtful, however, if the material presented is suitable for the ethical development of young children. It presents the saint to the

child in the attempt to carry from her home a basket of food concealed beneath her cloak. She refuses to reveal to her husband what she is carrying and when he opens her cloak by force, he finds only roses, for a miracle has been worked. Now, the adult may be able to reason all this out, but to the child it simply presents a picture of wifely disobedience and subterfuge which is in no way improved for the young child because the end is good. Then follows the picture of the cruelty of the brother-in-law and the suffering of the outcast, for which there is no justification. And the final statement that the saint, in spite of all this persecution, was good to the poor and practiced mortification does not redeem the sketch from its objectionable features as material for the presentation of religious truth.

The second religious sketch is the story of Hermann Joseph and the apple. It presents the little boy as habitually talking to a statue of the Virgin and Child and finally tells of the statue bending down and accepting the apple from the boy. The legend has little value from any point of view and there are some features of it that are not free from objection, as it makes the boy endow the statue with life and pray to it.

Lesson 32 is a story about the picture of the Holy Night. The artistic unity is not preserved; it begins with a description of the picture and tells of its being painted by a great painter and then passes on to moralize about the great Lord of Heaven and earth becoming poor for our sakes and having no servants to wait on Him. It ends up with an exhortation to the children to be like the poor people whom Our Lord loved.

The next religious story, Lessons 43 and 44, entitled A Legend of the Holy Child Jesus, tells of a little boy who pushed out in a boat alone to rescue people from a shipwreck and how he had saved a little baby and then both he and the baby were rescued from a watery grave by the Child Jesus. The story is simply told and there is undoubted dramatic feeling in it. It tells of the answer to prayer and of the working of a miracle. If any adverse criticism is to be passed upon it, it is concerning its unlikelihood and its impracticability. Moreover, why should we turn to legendary miracles when the

child has not yet become familiar with the great miracles related in the New Testament? As the story is presented in the book, it stands alone; it is not correlated with the sketches which precede it or with those which follow it.

Finally, there is given an account of St. Vincent de Paul and of the foundation of the Sisters of Charity. A little girl visits New York and writes to her mother about some of the pictures in the Museum of Art. "There is another picture that I want you to tell me something about. It represents St. Vincent with a number of little children and some Sisters of Charity. Now, mother, why is it that in pictures of St. Vincent there are always Sisters? Did he invent these Sisters or what is the reason of it?" (A very likely question for a seven year old child to ask.) This is in a second reader, but the mother's answer is couched in the language of an adult to an adult, as she gives an account of St. Vincent de Paul and the foundation of the Sisters of Charity. Many of the sentences are from five to six lines in length.

This is all the material in these two books that even pretends to be religious in character. Apart from these few sketches, there is nothing whatever in the books that is either religious or Catholic in tone. There is almost as much religious material and of fully as high a quality in readers that lay no claim to be religious. Evidently, these books are wholly out of the question if we admit the principle that the readers should contain the material for the presentation of the religious lesson. But of course they were not intended for that and in all fairness they should be judged on their merits merely as readers. But they have little claim to be called Catholic Readers.

The American Normal Readers are in a large measure an adaptation of the Stepping Stones to Literature. It is to be regretted that the sketches taken from these readers have been altered as in most cases they were told much better in the Stepping Stones. There is a story content in these books that can scarcely fail to interest the children, although it seems to me that much more might be done in the direction of unification. The religious element does not ap-

pear at all in the first half of the first book and this also seems to me a mistake. On page 60 of the First Reader the religious element is introduced. The preceding sketches in a measure prepare for it and the lesson itself is simple and sweet. Several pages are occupied with stories of birds and of the seasons and of the wind; these culminate in a religious sketch which is as follows:

Think of God's care for the birds. God cares for all that He has made. Our Father in Heaven loves us. He will take care of us. We are in His care. (To be memorized) "Behold, the fowls of the air; for they sow not neither do they reap nor gather into barns; yet your Heavenly Father feedeth them."

Between this and the end of the book there are several religious lessons including a study of the guardian angel, the story of the Nativity, the stories of David and of the Good Shepherd. The book closes with a sketch of St. Agnes and with the Beatitude, Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God, followed by a description of Heaven as the home of those who love God.

The religious material in the Second Reader is still more abundant and it is made effective by being coördinated with the other sketches. While we may rest dissatisfied with these books, we have every reason to be grateful for their appearance, as they mark a very decided step in advance from every point of view. Under such circumstances it would be ungracious to pick flaws or to quarrel with minor details in a work that possesses such genuine merit.

It is quite evident that these books may be made use of, to some extent, as a basis for the child's religious instruction. By the time the child has reached the religious lesson in the book he is prepared to comprehend something of its significance and it remains for the skilful teacher to develop the thought still further and to make the practical application. It may be questioned, however, whether there is sufficient material in the books for this purpose, or whether the religious material is sufficiently organized or whether it is presented in the right

sequence. Moreover, as may readily be seen from the previous articles in this series, the books do not meet our requirements in that they fail to make the religious element the central, co-ordinating, and dominating element of the work of the child's first years in school. The readers might, however, be used with great profit as supplementary readers where some such books as *Religion, First and Second Book*, are in the hands of the children as the text-books of the grades.

There is very little to be said in commendation of the *Standard Catholic Readers*. The paper is poor, the color daubs are atrocious; they would serve to destroy the child's artistic taste. The pen and ink sketches are of the poorest. As to the religious element, God is mentioned some dozen times in the *First Reader*. The children are told that God made them and gave them every thing they have and that they must be thankful to Him and pray to Him. They are told something about the angel guardian, and the book closes with the Lord's Prayer. The religious element is dragged in; it does not grow out of the book, it is not at the heart of it. Cats and rats and dolls and kites and children's games, if they may be called that, form the staple of the book. The *Second Reader* contains four sketches from the Old Testament and four stories of the New Testament events and closes with a rhyming rendition of the legend of the boy giving the apple to the statue of the Mother and Child. As isolated bits of religious matter, these sketches have been used over and over again and will always be used as standard material for the religious instruction of children. The Old Testament sketches are of Solomon's Temple, of Joseph, of Moses in the bullrushes and of king David. It is simply a question of how well they are adapted in the telling to the capacity of the children. The New Testament sketches consist of a brief sketch of the Blessed Virgin's life, the journey of Mary and Joseph to Bethlehem, ending with the stories of the Nativity, the Three Wise Men, the Flight into Egypt, and a short sketch of the boyhood of Jesus. As in the case of the *First Reader*, the religious stories do not constitute an organic part of the book; they are merely interjected into a content that bears little or no relationship to them.

The distribution of colored pictures in the books is purposeless. Every one at all familiar with the ways of children knows how they delight in colored pictures irrespective of their subject or artistic value. This in itself constitutes a grave reason for being careful in giving them only what is artistically correct in color. Wrong color combinations have as much power to do harm as correct combinations have to do good. The colors should be used to emphasize for the child the objects in the book which we want him particularly to love. Now, the colored pictures in these books are about on the level of the color work of the Sunday newspapers; they are a menace to the children's artistic taste. Moreover, the color emphasis in both books is laid chiefly on the non-religious and unimportant scenes. All the religious pictures in the first book, with the exception of the frontispiece, are in black and white, while the animals and birds and children and fruit are occasionally represented in color. In the second book the story of Joseph is illustrated in color, but the two pictures are faulty in this that they represent Joseph and Benjamin as little boys. Joseph as a little boy interprets Pharaoh's dream and is at once made governor over all Egypt and Benjamin, brought down to Egypt by his brothers, is a little boy, whereas the Biblical narrative presents him to us as a married man and the father of a family. It is a very dangerous thing to take liberties of this kind with Bible stories, for in this way we lay the foundation for future doubt of the whole story in the minds of the children.

But why waste time on these books? It is hard to see on what grounds they can base a claim to be considered Catholic readers. The books are cheap from every point of view. Illustrations that might have been condoned ten or twelve years ago are unpardonable to-day in view of the improved methods which now obtain. Surely our schools have too much self-respect to be taken in by such a cheap bid for their trade.

Statistics published recently by the Bureau of Education and the work done by Mr. Ayres on the Russell Sage Foundation call attention to the fact that something like six million children in the public schools of this country are repeating the

work of the grades. Furthermore, it is shown that the overwhelming majority of these children become discouraged and leave school long before the completion of the grammar grades. Defective methods in the primary grades are responsible for a large portion of this evil, for the laggards are chiefly confined to the first five grades. Of course other elements enter into the process of manufacturing dullards, such as the failure to adjust the work of the grades to the capacity of the pupils, irregular attendance, bad home conditions, etc., but experience also shows that where the interest of the children is captured from the beginning and where the work of the grade is made interesting, success rewards the children's efforts and with the hope and the courage thus aroused they seldom drop behind their fellow pupils.

Unfortunately we have no statistics at hand which would reveal to us the state of this problem in our Catholic schools. There is little doubt, however, that conditions will be found to parallel those which obtain in the public schools. We have every reason to hope that they are better. For this hope many reasons might be assigned, but it is profitless to discuss the problems until we are in possession of the requisite data.

The fact that the taxpayers of the United States are called upon to contribute some \$27,000,000 annually to defray the expenses of the work of permanently discouraging and turning into dullards so large a percentage of our children should make all who are responsible for the work of our schools pause. It is evidently high time that everything connected with the work of the primary grades be looked into. Everything that is in our power must be done to improve text-books and methods to the end that we may save the children who are entrusted to the schools. Interests of book concerns and the vested rights of antique methods must not be allowed to stand in the way of the solution of this vital problem. At present, however, we are only concerned with one factor of this many sided problem, namely, with the production of text-books suitable for the little children in the primary grades. In these pages we have pointed out the numerous defects of the books in present use. It is far

more important, however, to obtain a clear concept of what the ideal text-book should be. Until this is done we cannot hope for steady improvement nor will those who are responsible for the selection of text-books have an available standard by which to pass an intelligent judgment on the relative merits of the books which are actually in the field.

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THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte von Dr. theol. and phil. J. Marx. Vierte verbesserte Auflage. Trier, 1908.

The manual of ecclesiastical history by the Rev. J. Marx, D. D., Ph. D., given to the public for the first time in 1903, saw its fourth edition in 1908. The rapid succession of editions is an evident sign of its usefulness ; and it is indeed an excellent guide for the students as well as the professors of our Catholic seminaries. In the first place it is very complete and comprehensive. A few introductory paragraphs give a description of ecclesiastical history and of its sources of information ; then follows an outline of the conditions of the pagan and Jewish world at the time of Christ, and of the establishment of the church ; the growth of the church, its conflicts with the existing civil powers, its organization, its teaching, its discipline, and its moral life, are dealt with in each successive period. All in all, most of the questions usually discussed in a general course of church history are treated in this manual ; there are some subjects, like the number of martyrs during the early persecutions, which one would look for in vain in other books of the kind. The work contains detailed doctrinal explanations of incidents which are of special importance on account of the theological difficulties they suggest. The attitude of Pope Liberius during the Arian conflicts, the attitude of Pope Honorius during the monothelitical controversy, and his condemnation by the sixth ecumenical council, are placed in the light in which they must be viewed both by the historian and the theologian. The value of the book is greatly enhanced by the many references to original authorities and standard works, placed either at the head of each topic, or else in the foot-notes. A very special feature is found in the original texts at the end of the volume, which are few in number but judiciously chosen.

The Law of Church and Grave, the Clergyman's Handbook of Law. By Charles M. Scanlan, LL. B. New York, Benziger Bros., 1909. Pp. xxvi, 251. Price \$1.35 net.

Present-day relations between Church and State are giving rise in every country to a special body of law, emanating from secular

authority but governing ecclesiastical affairs, and to a constantly growing literature which aims at presenting in orderly fashion the conclusions of moment to the church, deducible from scattered statutes and decisions. To this literature, already voluminous in Europe and not inconsiderable in the United States, the present work is a contribution.

It contains a great deal of useful and important information, is well indexed, and is one of the few attempts to view this field from a Catholic stand-point. But it does not meet the need which exists for a scientific, thorough, masterly work on this so-called "ecclesiastical" law in our country. In less than 240 pages, divided into 34 chapters, the author traverses our constitutions, state and national, the decisions of our federal and state courts, and still has time and space to touch on Roman and Greek legal history, the relations of English to Roman law, and charivari or wedding-pranks. It would require much more than the space properly allowable to a book review to discuss the numerous and evident errors which even a cursory reading will reveal; *e. g.*, "the code of the church is the Ten Commandments;" "major excommunication non tolerati is unlawful in the United States;" "a priest cannot be suspended from his priestly functions without specific accusation and trial." An attempt to verify several references has convinced the reviewer that sufficient care was not taken in regard to the citations of decisions, which to many will appear the most important feature of the book.

The Classical Moralists. Selections illustrating Ethics from Socrates to Martineau. Compiled by Benjamin Rand, Ph. D., Boston, New York and Chicago. Houghton, Mifflin Company.

Following the same plan as that on which he constructed his useful book, "Modern Classical Philosophers," Dr. Rand has produced a companion volume for the student of ethics. It is a compilation of characteristic extracts drawn from the masters and other writers who have achieved a permanent place in Ethical speculation. The volume ranges from the "Memorabilia" of Xenophon to Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory." The compiler has, generally speaking, exercised discretion both in his choice of names and in the selection that he has made of representative extracts; though there are some salient exceptions to which we shall presently refer. Plato's thought is represented by the "Republic"; Aristotle's by those chapters of the "Nicomachean Ethics" which treat of the end of conduct and the

nature of virtue. To jump to the moderns, three sections of the "Metaphysic of Morality," speak for Kant, while two or three of the most characteristic chapters from the "Data of Ethics," give a fair idea of the trend of Herbert Spencer's essay in ethical construction.

The book will be a convenience and of service to the student as a needed supplement to the text-book. Every teacher is aware of the advantages which the student reaps from coming into contact at first hand with any work that is worthy study at all, instead of becoming acquainted with it only in second-hand or tenth-hand statements, which are usually devoid of all vitality, jejune and, frequently, inaccurate. As it is not every student who has convenient access to all the works from which Mr. Rand has drawn, this volume will serve, as far as it goes, for an extensive library of ethics. The excerpts are of generous length; and, usually, represent what is characteristically constructive in the originals.

The editor, however, means this work to be very much more than a mere collection of specimens. He intends the book to represent the course of development which ethical speculation has followed. The selections, he claims, "exhibit nearly in chronological order the chief doctrines of the classical moralists, alike in ancient, mediaeval, and modern ethics." This claim challenges criticism. It is true that the chronological order has been followed in the arrangement of authors; but on the question of doctrines, that is another story. In fact, one has but to inspect the table of contents to be convinced that no ingenuity could manage to arrange both the men and the thoughts in the one same chronological sequence. To cite one or two conspicuous instances in which the work fails to give a correct view of the order in which doctrines have been formulated, we may mention, first, the case of Ralph Cudworth. To this seventeenth century writer is reserved the honor of setting forth the doctrine of the eternal, immutable distinction between right and wrong. Why not assign it, at latest, to the fourteenth century? It is luminously laid down in the "Summa" of St. Thomas. Again, as a second instance, we may note that the appearance of the doctrine of the supremacy of conscience is unduly retarded when its promulgation is assigned to the good Bishop Butler, who only gives eloquent expression to a christian principle which St. Paul announced more tersely.

The editor would not unwittingly have committed the first of these oversights if he had made a happier selection, from the works of St. Thomas. He, indeed, assigns a fair proportion of space to Thomistic ethics; but it is filled exclusively with six *Quaestiones* from the 2^a 2^{ae}.

Here the doctrine, except what concerns the theological virtues, is mainly Platonic and Aristotelian. The distinctive principles of scholastic ethics would have been much more accurately reproduced by a selection from St. Thomas' treatment of the end of man, the Eternal and Natural Law, and the function of right reason as the subjective norm of right and wrong.

Turning to another consideration, we cannot understand why J. J. Rousseau, whose influence for good or evil has been, and is, so widespread and profound over modern thought and life, should have been passed over, while names of incomparably less significance are included. And the same may be said, less emphatically, regarding Auguste Comte.

If, however, Mr. Rand scarcely fulfilled his plan of presenting a history of ethics, the value of his work, as far as its primary aim is concerned is not thereby diminished.

JAMES J. FOX.

Religion, Second Book, by E. A. Pace and T. E. Shields. The Catholic Education Press, Washington, D. C., 1909. Pp. 160. Price 50 cents, net.

From one point of view, the series of text-books of which this is the second, may be regarded as a practical insistence upon the principle that religion should have the central place and be the moving spirit of education. To that end, in these books the child is taught reading and religion together. The selection of matter and its presentation are all with a view to meeting the child's understanding, consulting while advancing his powers. Book Second is essentially the same in method as Book First, now well known. There is change of subject matter, development of vocabulary and general advance in treatment to suit the growing mind of the pupil. The central truth considered is the Incarnation, carefully approached by the method of parable. The book leads up to and closes with the idea of sin and its forgiveness. This book, like its predecessor, is an effort to bring sound psychology and common sense to bear upon the teaching of religion. Music, illustrations, type, paper, are of the expected excellence.

CHARLES L. O'DONNELL, C. S. C.

The Problem of Human Life as viewed by the Great Thinkers from Plato to the present time. By Rudolph Eucken, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Jena. Translated from the German by Williston S. Hough and W. R. Boyce Gibson. New York, Scribners, 1910. Pp. xxv-582. Price \$3.00 net.

This excellent English presentation of Professor Eucken's *Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*, which has already commanded much attention in Germany, will not disappoint the friends and admirers of the Jena professor. Those who in the past looked to him as the most sympathetic of the rationalistic critics of Christianity will not be disappointed in the volume before us. Advanced Catholic thinkers, who, in the spirit of thankfulness for crumbs that fall from the table of every philosopher who has not the misfortune to be a scholastic, have lauded the works and approved the opinions of the author, will point with justifiable pride to his latest achievement. Not only they, but all who have at heart the interests of spiritual philosophy and constructive religious thinking will welcome a work in which Christianity and its Divine Founder, the mission of the Church, and the historical struggle for the maintenance of religious morality are treated with intelligent reverence and enlightened sympathy. Those, especially, who were impressed by the uncompromising and intransigent challenge of Dr. Eucken's Berlin colleague, the author of *Philosophia Militans*, may take courage at the realization of the qualified favor which traditional Christian views meet at the hands of this distinguished German professor.

Professor Eucken's philosophy is a peculiar system of spiritual and religious Activism. He puts life above thought, as all thinking men do. The mistake which, as it seems to us, he makes is in assuming that philosophy can furnish a scheme of life. He does assume this, and having assumed it, he naturally, and from his point of view, logically, contends that thought should not dominate life, but life, thought; in other words, he places the value of knowledge above theoretical validity, including, however in his conception of "value" not merely practical, but also spiritual, worth. The present book, he tells us, in the Preface, is designed to afford historical confirmation of this view. In it, he surveys the thoughts of all the great teachers of ancient and modern times. It is thus a history of philosophy and at the same time a philosophy of history. The result of his investigation is the conclusion that "In the first place, there are other forces at work in man than mere intellectualistic reflection, and, secondly, in

the higher strata of the intellectual atmosphere quite different currents prevail from those which are influencing the life of the people generally and even the so-called cultured sphere" (p. 568). This justifies him in the optimistic opinion that "Despite all the complexities of the present situation, we may conclude our historical survey without any gloomy forebodings. So long as belief can rise from the contemplation of that which is merely human to the recognition of a spiritual world, we can look on our perplexities as purely transitional, and, while striving to mould life afresh, can still draw much that is of value from the spiritual treasure-house of the past. For the past, rightly understood, is no mere past" (p. 570).

The author's estimate of Christianity is, on the whole, just. In spite of his initial failure to distinguish between the domain of philosophy and that of religion, he succeeds in presenting a picture of the essence of Christianity which in the main, is true. That is, if any picture of Christianity can be true, which overlooks the importance of the dogmatic element and the necessity of faith. Among the texts which he quotes from the Gospels as illustrative of the spirit of primitive Christianity, why do we not find the text "He that believeth not shall be condemned?" And is it fair to characterize as "ecclesiastical interpretation," all the historical developments of Christianity which do not agree with the author's determination of what Christ taught? The omission of all discussion of the meaning and function of Grace is surely a serious defect in an inquiry concerning the various "philosophies" of Life. "Harsh" is a word which Professor Eucken is fond of using. And harsh we must pronounce his treatment of "ecclesiasticism" (pp. 205 ff.). Harsh, too, is his judgment of St. Augustine's discussion of the Problem of Evil. Indeed, his whole treatment of St. Augustine is little short of unworthy. It is true, the Bishop of Hippo was guilty of self-contradiction—witness the *Retractationes*—but, is it just to say that he holds one view speculatively and adopts the opposite view practically because, being by nature a doubting Thomas, he was obliged to cling to the authority of a visible Church? Again, it is not entirely clear that Neo-Platonism had a direct determining influence on the sacramental system of the Church. Quite the contrary, one should conclude from a study, for instance, of Eriugena's doctrine of the Eucharist. The depreciating estimate of Thomas à Kempis, the exaltation of Luther as one who introduced "a new life full of fresh and glad activity" (p. 276), and the insistence on a sharp antithesis between the sensuous and the spiritual, reveal the Protestantism of the author, no matter how fully he may have transcended the Protestant point of view.

The translation is well done. Here and there an expression has been allowed to stand which a careful revision should have excluded : for instance "Thomas of Aquinas" (p. 311) and "Reason could no nothing" (p. 354). The book is suggestive and stimulating, and will, no doubt, do more to sustain the spiritual estimate of human life than many a more rigorous treatise from the pen of a scholastic writer.

WILLIAM TURNER.

History of Medieval Philosophy. By Maurice De Wulf, D. Ph., etc., Professor of Philosophy at the University of Louvain. Translated by P. Coffey, D. Ph., Professor of Philosophy, Maynooth College, Ireland. London, Longmans, 1909. Pp. xii-519.

The second edition of De Wulf's *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* was well known to all students of the history of scholasticism, and the regret was often expressed that the work was not accessible to English-speaking students. This want has been filled by Dr. Coffey in his translation of the third edition of M. de Wulf's work. The translation is well done, is, in fact, worthy of the original and up to the standard of Dr. Coffey's version of *Scholasticism Old and New*.

The work is divided into two parts. The first, occupying less than a hundred pages, gives a rapid survey of Greek and Patristic philosophies which exerted a direct influence on medieval thought. The second, occupying the remainder of the volume, takes up in detail the history of medieval philosophy, which the author divides into four periods : medieval philosophy to the end of the twelfth century, medieval philosophy in the thirteenth century, medieval philosophy during the fourteenth and the first half of the fifteenth century and, finally, medieval philosophy from 1450 to the end of the seventeenth century. This chronological arrangement has its advantages, especially when the historian, as M. de Wulf does, singles out the doctrinal synthesis of St. Thomas of Aquin, and in treating of post-Thomistic philosophy devotes attention only, or mainly, to those doctrines which diverge from, or contradict, the teaching of St. Thomas. Historical subdivisions are, after all, a matter of convention, or convenience, and M. de Wulf has certainly earned the right to his own preference in the matter of method and arrangement. Still, although, as he tells us in the Preface, he has consented in some instances to retract the name *anti-scholastic* and substitute *non-scholastic* as descriptions of medieval philosophies which do not agree with the "doctrinal synthesis," we

cannot refrain from expressing once more our regret that the learned historian has not made further concessions to friendly criticism. It is entirely in a spirit of friendliness towards him, and out of a sense of what is fairly due a great, though misguided, scholastic, that we repeat a protest frequently expressed in these pages against classing John Scotus Eriugena as an "anti-scholastic." The Glosses on Boethius' *Opuscula* (which we miss in the bibliographical note to Eriugena), show how, once the great ninth century Irishman was free from the immediate influence of the Pseudo-Dionysius, he could fall in line with the other precursors of St. Thomas.

It would, however, be invidious to find fault with a work which is replete with scholarly information, which presents an accurate and sympathetic picture of scholasticism as a system, and which is certainly a valuable contribution to our all too scanty literature on medieval philosophy. Friend and foe of scholasticism will alike rejoice to be able at last to refer the enquirer to a reliable account in English of the great medieval thinkers to whom the modern world is indebted for more than it is willing to acknowledge.

Special thanks are due Dr. Coffey for his painstaking work. It is, no doubt, a labor of love for a disciple of De Wulf and a firm believer in scholasticism. Nevertheless, we hope that besides the consciousness of having done a good deed, he will have the reward of knowing that his work is appreciated by a large circle of readers.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Old Criticism and New Pragmatism. By J. M. O'Sullivan, M. A. (R. U. I.), D. Phil. (Heidelberg), Fellow of the Royal University of Ireland. Dublin, M. H. Gill & Son; New York, Longmans, 1909. Pp. xiii-317. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

This is no book for beginners in philosophy. It presupposes an acquaintance with the terminology and contents of the most important systems of transcendental criticism; it presupposes also a considerable amount of training in philosophical thinking. It is by no means easy reading. The advanced student of metaphysics, however, will find it stimulating and satisfying. If he has sufficient interest in the problems discussed, he will find it a reliable guide.

The volume treats of two very distinct movements in nineteenth century thought, the criticism of Kant and Hegel, and the pragmatism of Professors James, Dewey and Schiller. The best chapters in the

book are the chapters on Comparison between Kant's and Hegel's Method and that on Criticism and Pragmatism Compared. The study is original, thorough and founded on a first-hand acquaintance with the systems dealt with. There is nothing very brilliant in the descriptions, nor is there any care taken to relieve what some, even among the adepts in philosophy, will consider the dull monotony of the exposition and criticism. Indeed, there is at times a failure to bring the thought to focus. But that is less the fault of the author than the misfortune of those about whom he writes. If even Hegel's occasional boldly picturesque characterization of the abstract is "superseded" by a perfectly ponderous restatement of the same in technical language, and the result is a blur, it would not be fair to blame Dr. O'Sullivan, who has honestly striven to give Hegel's thought in its original form. One does, however, regret that "the Greek element in Hegel's thought" to which the author refers incidentally, is not developed to the point of adding freshness, vitality and vividness, and thus relieving the strain of mathematico-metaphysical thinking. The allusion (p. 267) to the "regrettable humour" of the pragmatists is a point well made: much of the humor referred to is *diverting* in a sense not intended by its authors. Yet, somehow, when Dr. O'Sullivan has shifted the enquiry from Criticism to Pragmatism we are in a clearer, though perhaps not in a healthier, atmosphere.

Dr. O'Sullivan's point of view, from which he sees clearly the fundamental misconceptions of both the Criticist and the Pragmatist, is that of epistemological realism. True to the basic principles of the school in which he received his philosophical training, he holds "the doctrine that we can know only our own mental states" to be not only not self-evident but actually false (p. 306).

WILLIAM TURNER.

Christian Pedagogy, or The Instruction and Moral Training of Youth, by Rev. P. Halpin. New York, Joseph F. Wagner, 1909. Pp. xv + 229. \$1.50.

The scarcity of Catholic literature in English on the subject of Pedagogy will cause many to turn to this volume by Father Halpin for light. There is no need to offer an apology for a book on this subject, provided the book treats the subject in a worthy manner. In the opening paragraph of his Introduction Father Halpin says: "The only excuse for a book of this kind is, that it may be a help towards

keeping to the fore the old-time saving principles of all education and towards strengthening the legitimate protest against all dangerous encroachment, a protest that should grow louder and more general in these days, when enlightened defenders of these principles are not as numerous or as well-equipped as they should be in this fight which is so furiously raging around the foundations of civilization. It may seem exaggeration to identify pedagogy with the security of the home and the state. But what the mind is imbued with, sooner or later is translated into action. As a man's mind thinks so does his hand act."

The book lays little claim to scientific treatment and still less to originality. On page 13 the author gives expression to this characteristic trait of his book: "Christian pedagogy is a term which explains itself, and it is patent to everybody that it means the upbringing of the child according to the principles which have been introduced into the world by Christianity. It is an easy matter to call everything said in relation to it a platitude. Yet platitudes do not always mean utterances that have been heard for ages, and by everybody, and are understood by all. Granting, however, that they were, and were nothing more, it is not the characteristic of sound sense to decry them and to banish them from the pens and tongues of men."

The style in which the book is written is somewhat heavy and involved, and the thought loses much of its force by the lack of organization. The book is divided into two parts: Christian Pedagogy and Christian Pedagogy Applied. The first part is divided into the following chapters: Pedagogy, The Scientific Value of Pedagogy, Christian Pedagogy, Practical Work of Christian Pedagogy, The Subject of Christian Pedagogy: Youth, Home Education, The School, The Human Soul, The Human Body, The Senses, The Brain and the Imagination (two chapters), The Mental Operations, The Will, The Memory, Truth, Obedience, Honor, Self Respect, Law, Reward and Punishment, Manners, Conceit, Respect for Others, Degeneracy, Heredity, Taste, Country, Religious Influence. The second part includes the following chapters: The Matter of Education, The Children, Method, Personalities and Conditions, Temperament, Memorizing, Dangers, Qualifications of Instructors, Justice, Coöperation, Success, Preparation for Religious Instruction, Bible History, Catechism, Liturgy, Church History, Public Prayer and Congregational Singing, Attention, The Perfect Teacher, The Perfect School.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

Readings on American Federal Government, edited by Paul S. Reinsch. Boston, New York, Chicago, London : Ginn & Co., 1909. Pp. xii + 850.

Students who begin their examination of our Federal Constitution at the Preamble and read to the end of the Fifteenth Amendment are in danger of believing that they know the National Government of the United States. Article II, for example, tells them that the Executive Power is vested in a President of the United States who "shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present shall concur." From this very clear statement of the extent of executive authority in the matter of making treaties, it would scarcely occur to the student just beginning a course in political science that any President without "the advice and consent of the Senate" would attempt to enter into *arrangements* with foreign states where, in the circumstances, the Constitution gave him no power to make *treaties*.

Article III will have taught him that the judicial power of the Nation, which is probably of equal extent with the legislative power, is "vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." In this he perceives no warrant for executive interference or even executive criticism. Judge Humphreys, whose theoretical knowledge is doubtless well in hand, must have experienced something of a shock when a recent President brought him to book for exercising judicial discretion.

From his formal acquaintance with the Constitution the student knows, too, that Congress is empowered to declare war. Indeed, all American history tells him so. Fancy his surprise, then, to find a President of the United States using the armed forces of this Nation to prevent an independent state from attempting to assert her claim over a seceding province. This, too, has been done "within the memory of men still living."

It is unnecessary to cite other illustrations of conflict between the written Constitution and the objective fact, which is sometimes referred to as the "Providential Constitution of the American people." In this decade it may be a President that seems to transcend the limits of his authority; more than two-score years ago it was Congress that ignored the written instrument and registered whatever appeared to be a popular demand.

Enough has been said to show that there are different types among

our Presidents and that changes may come over the sentiments of Congress. That, for instance, we may at one time have as President one who looks closely to the law of the Constitution and sees little beyond the leaves of his book, and at another time have one who is not only willing but anxious to have enacted into law those large principles which support great social movements. Though the latter type may be regarded as, in some sense, lawbreakers, they can scarcely fail to gain the esteem of the people.

In this book Professor Reinsch has placed the teachers of American history as well as the students of our institutions under considerable obligations, for he has brought together in a convenient volume excellent material for much profitable work. It is such reading that is necessary to give students an insight into actual government.

C. H. MCCARTHY.

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE COLLEGE AND THE WILL.

The following brief discourse was delivered by the Right Reverend Rector at the banquet which followed the installation of Dr. Edmund C. Sanford as president of Clark College, Worcester, Mass., in succession to the late Carroll D. Wright, first president of that College, and long connected with the Catholic University as a lecturer on Social Economy.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen:—

“In the presence of this audience I may easily assume that the college, and particularly a New England college, is a place for developing the intellect of a boy, and I suppose we ought henceforth say, of a girl. In any academic history of our country, New England might easily claim the principal chapter, as the original home of the institutions through which our American mind is now trained and guided,—the public school, the academy, the high school, the woman’s college, the university. Knowledge, its content, principles, methods, uses, advancement, almost its apotheosis, is a chief concern of our citizenship. Really it is not without reason that we have come to be called the Athenians of our time, so ardent is our pursuit of learning, so brilliant the success attained and so distinguished the progeny of scholars whom New England is proud to call her own. This is enough to prove that in New England colleges the mind of our youth is cultivated in a very high degree.

“However, just as man is made up of a body and an informing moving spirit, so is his moral nature made up of mind and will. If the mind be the eye of the spirit, the will is its motor force, its efficient guide, its captain and master in all that pertains to practical life. If the mind discovers and appreciates ideals, it is the will that enables us to choose among them, to range one above another, and to disregard all obstacles in the pursuit of the chosen ideal or rather to conquer obstacles and work them into the service of whatsoever has come to seem to us supremely good and beautiful. If by the mind we follow after all truth it is by the will that we set aside practically what is only seeming truth, *i. e.*, falsehood, error, deception, and adhere to what is solid and permanent in every department of knowledge. This

is equivalent to saying that the college is not less interested in the training of the will of youth than in the training of its mind. Indeed, it would be right to say that the training of the will is really the more important, since it is generally admitted that a society formed on mere intellectual cleverness carries with it the germ of decay, if only because it tends to become unduly aristocratic, selfish, and miscellaneously unjust.

“If knowledge be the flower of the intellect, the flower of the will is character, that outward and visible sign by which the individual is known in the community for just what he is worth, those peculiar and indefaceable moral traits by which he is coined, as it were, and irrevocably appreciated among his fellowmen.

“And just as the college ought to send out its youth, intellectually formed and equipped for the demands that society, which pays the bills, is justified in making, so it ought to send out its youth morally trained, formed, exercised for the broad and varied life that opens before them. Of course, it is not expected that the college graduate will begin life with that moral grasp on duties and responsibilities that the greybeards of the city possess, any more than he is expected to enter his profession on the same level with those who have toiled their long and painful way to its great prizes.

“But he ought to be able to know practically what is duty, truth, even righteousness; he ought to appreciate honor, equity, mutual kindness; he ought to esteem and acquire restraint of self, and consideration for others who are moving with him in the long procession of life; he ought to prize certain great fundamental virtues of humanity, like patience and moderation; he ought to feel, at least in a general way, that he belongs in no small measure to the body politic, and must therefore be ready in due time to bear its heavy burdens with equanimity, justice, courage, and a readiness to one day make great sacrifices for its welfare. The virtues of a good citizen may be read in many books from Plato down, but they are acquired by practice only, and in each generation by every individual for himself. The high moral character which distinguishes man from man is acquired mainly in youth, and mainly again by contact with living models of the same. In other words it is the college teacher who is largely responsible for the formation of the will in youth. It is a truism confirmed I believe by the psychologists, that imitation is the law of life, and so the ideals, principles, habits, views of the teacher are insensibly but surely and regularly taken over by the pupil; for his moral nature this is the line of least resistance. Even the so-called self-made men of American

society, if there be really any self-made men, surely formed themselves on some models, whether studied in books or personally familiar to them. We may not know who fashioned the great heart of Abraham Lincoln, but we may believe that in some one he saw embodied the moral ideas that later took shape in his thoughts and were eventually given by him a concrete life.

“This moral responsibility of the teacher for the formation of character, the development of will-power, the right moral appreciation of the world and life, is not easily over-estimated. And I may be pardoned, *en passant*, for saying that this is why the oldest and most experienced of the great religious bodies which now influence the new world, has in education always laid more stress on the teacher than on the things taught, on the personality of the guide than on the way traveled, on an upright heart and a pure conscience than on vast secular information, on the ultimate purpose of human life than on its transient interests, however worthy and useful.

“To come back to the college, it should be and can be a real nursery of the will, a gymnasium of all its powers and qualities. Study and discipline, success and failure, praise and reproof, deportment and play itself, have deep moral roots that ought to be laid bare to the youthful mind. The training of the will is of course not a thing apart from that of the intellect. It is rather like an atmosphere, something so regular, so subtle, so habitual, so facile, so penetrative and infusive of the entire nature of youth that the morally trained pupil comes out of college at once scholarly and virtuous, at least by temper and desire, by admiration and purpose. Let me add that if ever a society needed in its colleges this sure and steady formation of the will power of youth, it is our own, standing as it does on the edge of a new order, in a transitional stage, when world-wide industry and commerce are reshaping all former social and economic relations, when the urban man is replacing the rural man as the moral unit, the social cell of the nation, when great multitudes must be variously assimilated with the least possible disturbance, when the old customs and traditions that served fairly well a small, but generally homogeneous, people have fallen before the advance of new multitudes different in mentality as in social, economic and political ways.

“It is from the college that should come the moral leaders of this new society, the men who must in the next fateful generation think, plan, and act for American mankind, take up the work where their fathers dropped it and, like the ‘*lampadophori*’ of old, hand over to their successors the freshly blazing torch of highest culture, aflame

not alone with the dry cold light of the intellect, but also with the warm emotional light of the loving self-sacrificing spirit.

“But for this it will not be enough that the college cultivate the minds of its pupils; it must with at least equal reverence and ardor recognize the deeply moral, and even the religious nature of youth. It must stand for the natural virtues, and permit me to say it, also for the Christian virtues that once sustained this New England through generations of poverty, toil, and insignificance, and then sent forth its hardy children as path-makers through the western wilds, founders of cities and of states, pioneers of every daring enterprise, and heralds as they went of political and social ideals that were first realized in the United States of America.

“I have no doubt that under the guidance of its new head Clark College will continue to render the city and the state all the services that could be expected of so hopeful an institution. Dr. Sanford brings to it learning and experience, the esteem of his colleagues and the confidence of his fellow citizens, the vigor of mature age and the idealism of the born educator. With what better capital could he embark on the task that lies before him? If I add the memory and the example of his upright, scholarly and large-hearted predecessor, Carroll D. Wright, all will agree with me that his lines are indeed cast in pleasant places, and that from decade to decade we may look for an ever-growing harvest of those fruits of good citizenship which it was the desire of the generous founder of this school to multiply in the heart of the commonwealth.”

HYPNOTISM, ITS USES AND ABUSES.

Public Lectures at the University.—On Thursday, January 13, the Very Reverend Dr. Edward A. Pace opened the Winter Course of public lectures. His subject was *The Uses and Abuses of Hypnotism*. The following is a résumé of Dr. Pace's lecture:

For our present purpose, it is not needful to trace the history of the practices and theories which are now grouped under the name of hypnotism. The weird performances of Messmer at the close of the eighteenth century, the investigation conducted by the French Academy of Sciences in 1784 and the report presented in 1831 to the Academy of Medicine—all these are undoubtedly interesting. But apart from the details, their importance lies chiefly in the fact that

scientists of repute, however skeptical at first, were finally obliged to recognize the existence, under forms more or less grotesque, of a real influence exerted by the hypnotiser upon his subject. On the practical side, this was certainly a step in advance. So long as the representative of science refused to see in these performances anything more than trickery or fraud, the charlatan and the mountebank had things their own way, and their way was not always the best. But a halt was called when it was realized that "magnetic fluids" and "celestial therapeutics" were simply pseudonyms for an agency that might be productive of good and had surely been abused to evil effect.

From the view-point of theory, the rival claims of Charcot's school at Paris and of the group which centred about Liebault at Nancy have been presented again and again, with the result that in the main the latter have prevailed. The explanation of hypnotic phenomena as products of suggestion is now so widely accepted that it may be said to have displaced the other theories and to have secured for hypnotism a somewhat tardy recognition as a legitimate method in psychological research.

The nature of suggestion will be more readily understood if we take as a starting-point the sensori-motor theory of normal consciousness. According to this each mental process involves both an afferent phase and an efferent phase. An impression produced on an organ of sense not only travels along a nerve-path to the brain but it also passes outward from the brain over a motor path and issues, or tends to issue, in some sort of action. The same is true of each image that is lodged in the brain and even of the abstract ideas conceived by the mind. If we add to this the natural tendency to believe what is told us and to act in accordance with our belief, we can easily see that an idea which is suggested or introduced into the mind will exert an influence that is stronger in proportion as other ideas are excluded. In our ordinary experience there is a constant checking or inhibiting of one idea by another; in hypnosis, the antagonistic ideas are put out of action, as it were, and the suggestion has the monopoly both of consciousness and of the motor apparatus. The so-called methods of hypnotization are intended to bring about such a concentration of the subject's mind that only the ideas introduced by suggestion will have any effect. The exclusive control thus obtained is of course more thorough when the subject has been trained and when hypnosis is deepest, *i. e.*, in the state of somnambulism.

Owing to the influence which the mind exerts upon the body, various disorders of a functional character yield to hypnotic treatment. In the

clinical records, hysteria and neurasthenia hold a prominent place. Indirectly, it is claimed, impaired organs also may be benefited. But where the organic lesion has reached a certain point, suggestion will not avail ; it will not check the growth of a tumour nor destroy bacilli. The results obtained in the treatment of vicious habits, *e. g.*, alcoholism, is due obviously to the psychological element in these excesses.

On the other hand, hypnotic practices are attended with dangers which are greater when the hypnotiser is ignorant of the nature of the phenomena he produces and of their effects on mental and organic processes. For this reason, if for no other, amateur performances in which hypnotism is introduced for the sake of amusement and public exhibitions which make it a sort of stage property, should be prohibited. Given the nature of hypnosis, the fact that almost any normal person can hypnotise another is the best reason why the use of hypnotism should be permitted to physicians only.

In its moral aspect, the danger arises from the surrender of the will to the control of another. It is true that the subject sometimes offers resistance to suggestions which are contrary to his sense of morality or propriety, but it is possible, by means of other suggestions, to remove the opposition ; and once this is cleared away, even criminal actions may be ordered, the performance of which may be postponed to a considerably later date. A hypnotiser who thus designs to use his subject as an instrument for evil doing, can obliterate all traces of his share in the crime for which in reality he is responsible as principal and not merely as accomplice. No long record of such transactions should be necessary to make it evident that the interests of justice call for restrictive measures which shall control the practice of hypnotism as closely at least as the regulations limiting the sale and use of certain well-known drugs.

The surest safeguard, however, is the education of the intelligence in regard to the real nature of hypnosis, showing the radical difference between it and what is merely curious or "mystifying" ; and especially the cultivation of the moral sense to such a degree that no sane mind will take the risk of giving over the freedom and of abandoning the personality which constitutes the moral agent.

THE BACKWARD PUPIL.

Rev. Dr. Thomas E. Shields took for the subject of his lecture, January 20, *The Backward Pupil*. Dr. Shields said :

We have always had the backward pupil with us. He has been the trial of every teacher's life. But it has only been within the last few years that there has been any realization of the vast number of pupils that belong to this class. Dr. Seguin's work in the closing decades of the last century called the attention of Europe to the possibility of curing a certain percentage of the children that were being classed as defective. The work of rescuing these unfortunates spread rapidly through Germany. In the nineties it was taken up in England and in a few years schools in which special training for these children was given had become a regular feature of the school system throughout Great Britain. Experience showed that two or three years of the right kind of treatment helped these children to such an extent that three-fourths of them were able to take up regular school work.

In 1904 the Superintendent of Schools of New York City startled the public by his report which showed that 39 per cent. of all the children attending the public schools of New York City were above the normal age for the grade which they were in. The annual reports for the following five years show that this condition of affairs has not changed. A great many causes were naturally assigned for this retardation and a great many evils in the public school system were attributed to this backward condition of the pupils. In his report of 1908 Commissioner Draper of New York State says: "I confess that it startles me to find that certainly not more than two-fifths and undoubtedly not more than a third of the children who enter our elementary schools ever finish them and that not more than one-half of them go beyond the fifth or sixth grade." Professor Thorndike of Columbia University, in a Bulletin issued by the Bureau of Education in February, 1908, concludes that "at least 25 out of every 100 of the children of the white population of our country who enter school stay only long enough to learn to read simple English, write such words as they commonly use, and perform the four operations for integers without serious errors. A fifth of the children entering city schools stay only to the fifth grade."

Mr. Leonard P. Ayres, working under the Russell Sage Foundation, has recently given us a valuable study of this problem in a book entitled "*Laggards in Our Schools*." More accurate data must be

had before we can accept as entirely reliable many of the conclusions at which Mr. Ayres arrives, but there is enough in his book that is incontrovertibly true to make everyone in any way responsible for our schools pause and give serious study to the problem there presented.

From the data at our disposal, it seems highly probably that there are at present in the public schools of the United States some six million children repeating the work of their grade at an annual cost to the taxpayers of the country of something over \$27,000,000. It should be remembered, however, that the financial consideration is not the chief one. Compulsory education laws compel the children to remain in school in most of our states between the ages of seven and fourteen. It is probable, therefore, that these six million retarded children would be in school in any case. But the statistics in the case show us that the children who are put back and compelled to make their grade over, with few exceptions, leave school just as soon as the compulsory education laws permit. For the most part they drop out in the fifth and sixth grades. The \$27,000,000, therefore, is expended, not for the benefit of these six million children but for their permanent discouragement. Manifestly, this problem needs looking into. Is the fault to be traced to congenital defects in the children or to mismanagement on the part of the school authorities? If the former, it is our duty to seek adequate remedies for these unfortunate children; if the latter, it becomes our duty to deal with the school officers who are responsible for this lamentable state of affairs.

The facts in the case show that there are many factors contributing to the retardation of these children: late beginning, irregular attendance, etc., but they also show that by far the largest percentage of the evil is directly traceable to the maladjustment of the work of the grades to the children who are compelled to take it. In many cities the problem has been met and solved to a large extent by a proper adjustment of the work to the capacity of the children. This is shown by the percentage of retardation which varies from $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in Bedford, Mass., to 75.8 per cent. among the colored children of Memphis, Tenn. Between these two extremes most of the cities of the country will be found to range. Thus the percentage of retardation in Waltham, Mass., is 10.6, in Meriden, Conn., 13, Boston, 18.5, Springfield, 23.3, New York, 30, Troy, N. Y., 35, Baltimore, Md., 46.3, Cincinnati, O., 58.7, Erie, Pa., 60.1.

Taking the country through, it may be shown that the work assigned to the grade is so far above the average capacity of the child that it takes on an average ten years to do the work of the eight

grades. The average time required for a child to complete the work of the eight grades in Erie, Pa., is 12.4 years, and in none of the twenty-five cities of which Mr. Ayres has made a comparative study does the average child do the work in eight years.

When the child is put back and compelled to repeat the work of a grade, he is humiliated and discouraged. He contracts habits of idleness and by his presence and example tends to demoralize the whole room. When the number of these retarded pupils is one-fourth or one-fifth the entire number in the grade, it is easy to realize the disastrous results which must follow.

Our schools are manufacturing dullards on a large scale. It is high time that the process was stopped. The work of the grade must not be determined by the caprice or the ambition of the school Superintendent but by the needs and capacities of children. After this has been done, we will still have a large number of children in our schools that are dull and backward because nature has been less generous with them than with other children. To find remedies for these we must turn to psychology and to the improvement of home conditions. At present the backward children, from whatever cause, exert a disastrous influence on the entire work of the schools and their presence in the schools is responsible for no small share of the failure of our school system, of which so much has been said during the last few years.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

The Annual Retreat for the students of Divinity Hall was given this year by Very Reverend L. F. Kearney, O.P., formerly provincial of the Dominicans.

Donations. The University is indebted to Michael Cudahy, Esq., of Chicago, a member of the Board of Trustees, for his generous contribution of five thousand dollars through which the Rector was enabled to pay the expenses of transferring the seventy thousand volumes of the University library from the basement of the Divinity Chapel to the present desirable quarters on the first floor of McMahon Hall. Prominent among the benefits thus secured, besides space, ventilation and light, is the excellent system of steel stacks by which a perfect preservation of this precious collection is practically assured.

The University is deeply indebted to the late Mrs. Caroline T. Wheaton of Poughkeepsie, N. Y., for the gift of ten thousand dollars from her estate. This sum was recently remitted to the University by her son, Mr. Isaac S. Wheaton.

By the will of Matthew Corr, lately deceased, of Philadelphia, the University becomes his residuary legatee. The special bequests and donations of Mr. Corr to relatives, charities, and educational institutions amount to nearly three hundred thousand dollars. At this writing it is not known precisely how much may come to the University, but it will probably be quite a large sum.

The late John McDonough, of the Ascension Parish, Evansville, Ind., bequeathed to the University the sum of five hundred dollars. Mr. McDonough, who was a native of Ireland, died recently at a patriarchal age, a model of all the Christian virtues. He was at all times deeply interested in the Catholic University as the ordinary means by which our young Catholic laymen could obtain a superior education without incurring those dangers to faith and morals that are only too often present in non-Catholic or purely secular centres of learning.

Public Lectures. On February 10, Hon. William H. De Lacy delivered a Public Lecture at the University on the "Rise of the Temperance Movement," and on February 17, another lecture on "What Temperance Means for the Child." These are the two annual Public Lectures called for by the Chair that The Catholic Total Abstinence Society of America founded at the University when it was first opened. Doctor De Lacy is a graduate of the University, a lawyer of distinction, and Judge of the Juvenile Court in Washington. He brings to this work therefore not only ability and deep sympathy, but also a practical and extensive experience in dealing with the results of intemperance.

Monsignor Shahan, the Rector of the University, took part on February 1, in the installation of Doctor Edmund Clark Sanford as second President of Clark College at Worcester, Mass. The first president of this institution was the well-known Carroll D. Wright, long United States Commissioner of Labor, a constant friend of the Catholic University and for several years one of its public lecturers on topics of Political Economy. Doctor Wright, it will be remembered, was a great admirer of the famous encyclical letter of Leo XIII. on labor, and proclaimed far and wide that it contained as no other modern document the true and final remedies for the settlement of all points of dispute between labor and capital.

On February 2, Monsignor Shahan lectured before the Catholic Woman's Club of Providence on "Education and Religion." Right Rev. Bishop Harkins and many of the city clergy were present, together with a very distinguished gathering of the Catholic gentlemen and ladies of the city. Afterwards a largely attended reception was tendered him by the Catholic Club in their new and spacious quarters.

Reverend Doctor George A. Dougherty. At a recent Meeting of the Sacred Congregation of Studies in Rome the Degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology was conferred on the Reverend George A. Dougherty, Assistant Treasurer of the University

and Secretary to the Rector. Dr. Dougherty has been connected with the University since 1903. During all those years he has served the University faithfully and devotedly. His many friends among the University Alumni, in the Alumni Association of the American College, of which he is the esteemed President, and throughout the country at large, will be pleased to learn of the distinction which Rome has conferred upon him.

Albert College. The fourth annual ball and reception of the Catholic University Athletic Association was held February 3rd at the New Willard Hotel and was, perhaps, the most brilliant of the series. The guests of the Association included representatives of the various seminaries and colleges of Washington, of local society, while a good quota of the faculty lent dignity to the affair by its presence.

In addition to the usual decorations of the ball room there were tastefully arranged banners of various colleges and universities; the reception rooms were adorned with palms and flowers and the whole was made resplendent by the blending of beautiful gowns and fair faces.

The arrangements were in charge of the dance committee consisting of the Messrs. Dougherty (chairman), Boillin, Hackman, Bohn, Rivero and Finn. These with the officers of the Association made successful an occasion which each season is looked forward to as the principal social event in college circles of Washington.

The patronesses were Mrs. George M. Bolling, Mrs. Wm. H. De Lacy, Mrs. Duncan N. Fletcher, Mrs. Robert J. Kennedy, Mrs. Thos. H. Carter, Mrs. Aubrey E. Landry, Mrs. Patrick J. Lennox, Mrs. Horace H. Lurton, Mrs. Chas. H. McCarthy, Mrs. Elmer J. Murphy, Mrs. Chas. P. Neill, Mrs. Frank O'Hara, Mrs. R. A. Sweeney Pescia, Mrs. Adele D. Hillyer, Mrs. John J. Walsh, Mrs. E. D. White.

The Athletic Association wishes to express its thanks to all those who have so generously contributed to its funds.